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ABSTRACT
The academic literature entails numerous anatomical studies on U.S.
and comparative corporate law, mainly focused on dissections of the
physical structures of corporate law. This Article makes a novel attempt to
apply the ancient Greek metaphysical approach to a temporal, anatomical
p2V R)2W*O12pL +*)Vj 1R tULpmp,Uf p2V O2 *),2f mO*P O*+ RO2VO2Q+ 1R tULpmp,U:+
innards, further addresses the longstanding debates on whether Delaware
races to the top or bottom, and whether Delaware is unitary or divergent
across space-time.
With a functionally focused approach inspired by Greek metaphysics,
this Article maps out natural correspondences between the legal entities of
corporate firms and the biological entities of society, such as a real person
versus a legal person, individually and collectively. Furthermore, the current
study lays bare the operating bowels of Delaware when faced with the
increasingly vaster corporate structures of American society, along three
major axes, the vertical (management versus shareholders), the horizontal
(controllers versus minority shareholders) and the external (internalities
versus externalities). In an attempt to shine light on the academic debate
po1)* *PU 2p*),U 1R tULpmp,U:+ W12+WO1)+2U++f *PO+ A,*OWLU W12V)W*+ p
historical analysis on key events across seven epochs of American history,
+P1mO2Q *PU O2RL)U2*OpL RpW*1,+ *Pp* UO*PU, +mpjUV 1, .,U+U,(UV tULpmp,U:s
postures, which have been as constant as pliant, like any well adaptive
biological organism in a large ecosystem.
Through a temporal analysis as well as metaphysical study of the
Delaware courts, the efficacy and efficiency of its judicial inner workings
are quite apparent. There is sufficient evidence pointing toward a balanced
+*,)W*),U 1R tULpmp,U:+ N),O+.,)VU2WUf mO*P p *U21, 1R +Pp,UP1LVU,
democracy and prosperity for all that races to the top, in other words, creating
a win-win situation for different nodes of corporate firms yoked to the market
like a colossal cobweb. Historical and functional evidence further show that
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despite the weathercock of the American economy and the ostensible state
1R RL)k mO*P ,U+.UW* *1 tULpmp,U:+ .1LOWOU+f *PU W1),* Pas been consistently
aiming at a fundamental unitary goal of establishing an economical
equilibrium for the corporate market and society, as to be expected of the
collective consciousness for a macrocosm compounded of equally
mutualistic but antagonistic microcosms.
Last but not least, I apply the approach of comparative law to a deeper
and broader question about the universality versus relativity of corporate
laws in different societies. Spatial and temporal comparisons of legal
infrastructures were conducted between the East and the West, the US and
the EU, as well as some intra-American states such as Delaware, the MBCA
and California. Once again, the cross-cultural studies reveal an interplay
between intrinsic and extrinsic factors of legal consciousness around the
world, time-wise and space-wise, which resonates with the simultaneous
monistic and dualistic natures of Delaware and beyond.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of tPU @PpUV,)+f >1W,p*U+ p+M+f “7PU,U V1 j1) W14Uf
@PpUV,)+ 4j R,OU2Vf p2V mPU,U p,U j1) Q1O2Q#” 1 In this Article, I reflect on
this question, first as a legal scholar in its most general sense, and then in my
field, as a corporate law scholar.
If we try to situate our current scholarly times into the history of ideas,
both pragmatism and logical positivism seem highly influential. 2 But in
other times, humanity has trodden other intellectual paths. Classical
metaphysics was not always a stranger to legal thinkers, in the larger
historical picture. For example, not to mention the ancient world, even as
late as the medieval educational period, metaphysics was an important part
1R POQPU, UV)Wp*O12d “r=qPU W),,OW)L)4 . . . came to include three
Aristotelian philosophies – .Pj+OW+f 4U*p.Pj+OW+ p2V 41,pL .POL1+1.Pjd” 3
* Seth Chertok, Visiting Associate Professor of Law at the University of Florida Levin
College of Law. I would like to thank my corporate law mentors Professors David Skeel and
Bill Carney for their consistent support of my teaching and legal scholarship over the years.
In addition, I would like to thank the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law for
their continued support as well as dedication and diligence in the editing process.
1. PLATO, Phaedrus, in PLATO: C OLLECTED DIALOGUES 476, 476 (Edith Hamilton ed.
1999).
2. Pragmatism is “a philosophy that stresses the relation of theory to praxis and takes
the continuity of experience and nature as revealed through the outcome of directed action as
the starting point for reflection.” CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 730 (2d ed. 1999).
“Three doctrines are associated with American pragmatism . . . : that beliefs are hypotheses
and ideas are plans of action; that ideas can be clarified by showing their relation to action;
and that beliefs are true when they are successful guides for prediction and action.” Richard
H. Popkin, THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 592 (Richard F. Popkin et al
eds., 1998) [hereinafter Popkin]. Logical positivism places an “emphasis upon sense
experience generated [by] the doctrine of empiricism; namely, that all knowledge derives
from the senses. The joint emphasis upon logic and experience explains why logical positive
is sometimes called <logical empiricism.:” Id. at 624.
3. Dimitris Romeo Havlidis, Medieval Education in Europe: A Force of Freedom and
Submission (March 20, 2015), https://www.lostkingdom.net/medieval-education-in-europe/
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YU*p.Pj+OW+ Wp2 oU VURO2UVf “41+* QU2U,pLLjf rp+q *PU .POL1+1.POWpL
investigation of the nature, constitution, and structure of reality. It is broader
in scope than science . . . since one of its traditional concerns is the existence
of non-physical entities . . d d” 4 “>1 )2VU,+*11Vf 4U*p.Pj+OW+ mp+ ,UNUW*UV oj
.1+O*O(O+4 12 *PU Q,1)2V *Pp* O*+ +*p*U4U2*+ p,U <W1Q2O*O(ULj 4Up2O2QLU++:
+O2WU *PUj p,U 21* U4.O,OWpLLj (U,OROpoLUd”5 In other words, it is seen as
impossible to jump from visible empirical observations to more intelligible
invisible forms.
AoNUW*O12+ p+OVUf \)VQU @1+2U, Pp+ pV(1Wp*UV R1, “*PU 41,U p4oO*O1)+
and challenging task of mastering political and moral philosophy,
economics, history, and other social sciences and humanities so that [the law
pWpVU4OWq Wp2 VO+W1),+U 12 Lp,QU -)U+*O12+ 1R .1LOWj p2V N)+*OWUd” 6 If the
legal academy is in a momentum of shifting toward more theoretical
interdisciplinary areas, then why not metaphysics as well?
Hence, in this Article, I advocate for legal scholarship combining
modern forms of Anglo-American empirical and pragmatic philosophical
analysis, with notions of metaphysics borrowed from the Greeks. By
combining the strengths of the ancients and moderns, what is invisible and
visible, I believe that I can lay bare the fundamental mechanisms of both the
firm and corporate law, and in turn answer some of the key debates that have
plagued corporate law uncertainty.
A. What is metaphysics?
Any metaphysics of corporate law surely must derive from a larger
metaphysics of existence. For these broad principles, I turn to the ancient
Greeks.
In the earliest Pre-Socratic period at the very dawn of Greek
.POL1+1.Pjf ^U,pWLO*)+ *p)QP* *Pp* “M21mLUVQU 1R *PU ,UpL” +P1)LV R1W)+ 12
*PU “<,UpL W12+*O*)*O12: hphysis) of things by paying attention to their
<W14412: 1, )2O(U,+pL p+.UW* p2V oj .,UWO+U p2V .p*OU2* +U2+U 1o+U,(p*O12
and open-4O2VUV2U++ *1 .1++OoOLO*OU+ h"KbKpf "KEgd”7
This patience, even though admittedly difficult and perplexing per the
moderns, obviously implies considerable reflection on empirical experience
[https://perma.cc/DBZ5-9D3V].
4. CAMBRIDGE D ICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 563 (2d ed. 1999).
5. Id.
6. Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113,
1119 (1981) (discussing the evolution of the history of legal scholarship in ever more
theoretical directions).
7. Popkin, supra note 2, at 10.
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leading to the intelligible. Plato thus writes: “7ULL *PU2f +P1m 4U mPp*f
precisely, this ideal is, so that, with my eyes on it, and using it as a standard,
] Wp2 +pj *Pp* p2j pW*O12 V12U oj j1) 1, p2jo1Vj UL+U O+d” 8
A+ 12U +1 ,URLUW*+ 12 *PU )2O(U,+pLf ^U,pWLO*)+ 1o+U,(UV *Pp* “r*PUq ,UpL
is unity, despite surface change and diversity, and even apparent opposites
in nature, like night and day, winter and summer . . d h"Gbgd”9 In other words,
the ever-changing empirical manifestations ultimately give rise to unitary
.,O2WO.LU+d “r=PU,U O+q p opWM-bending connection, like that of a bow or
Lj,Ud” 10 I view Plato as adding some useful metaphysical markers, as
follows:11
Forms
One
Same
Sensible Many Different
Reality

Invisible Unchanging Intellect
Visible
Changing
Senses

Truth
Knowledge
Appearance
Belief

Much later, the Neo-Platonist Plotinus hypothesized that the highest
intellectual goal was articulating the truth of what is absolutely necessary
(intrinsic) as opposed to contingent (extrinsic). 12
Philosophically, Plotinus argued that postulating Forms without a
superordinate principle, the One, which is virtually what all the
Forms are, would leave the Forms in eternal disunity. If this were
the case, then there could be no necessary truth, for all necessary
truths, e.g., 3 + 5 = 8, express a virtual identity, as indicated here
oj *PU <$< +OQ2d13
Hence, the goal of a metaphysics of corporate law should be to
articulate what is unitary and intrinsic, even as extrinsic corporate law might
ostensibly diverge in different sectors of space-time.
B. Utilities of a corporate metaphysis
At the highest level, it is important to build up a theory of corporate law

8. Plato, Euthyphro, in PLATO: COLLECTED DIALOGUES 174, 174 (Edith Hamilton ed.
1999).
9. Popkin, supra note 2, at 11.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 44.
12. Id. at 105 (“Commonsensibly, there are two kinds of truth, contingent and necessary
– for example, the contingent truth there are five coins in my pockets now, and the necessary
truth that two plus three equals five.”).
13. Plotinus, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, https://plato.stanford.edu/entrie
s/plotinus/ [https://perma.cc/T43A-J3BG].
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(with a focus on the standard Delaware public company), which scholars
have noted is sorely lacking. 14 Apart from filling this glaring theoretical gap,
I believe that there are several tangible scholarly utilities in establishing a
theoretical metaphysics of corporate law.
At a philosophical level, a metaphysics of corporations can humanize
the corporation and show both how it mirrors us as people – and its place in
nature and natural forces (also like us). It can also lead to a more
fundamental understanding of the corporation, with an eye towards its dual
visible and invisible characteristics, reminiscent of our cultural ancient
ancestors. Hence, a metaphysics of corporate law could add an invisible eye
to the kinds of anatomical studies, which focus on dissections of the physical
structures of Delaware corporate law. 15
Equally important, scholars for years have debated the race to the top
versus bottom question, meaning whether Delaware law has catered to
special interest groups, like powerful managers and controllers, and to some
internal favoritism to the detriment of external counter-parties, like creditors,
with non-value law, or whether Delaware has adopted a balanced and
economical approach for all. 16 Some scholars have undertaken empirical
studies on this topic, but the data has likely been inconclusive. 17 With this
debate likely at a dead end, it is worth turning to a metaphysics of corporate
law for answers.
Scholars have also, at least implicitly, debated whether the Delaware
law is unitary or divergent. I have heard the Delaware judges effectively
state that they are committed to timeless and continuing principles across
judiciary transitions, even though they admit to making some innovative
laws when needed (like say the Unocal doctrine).18 However, other scholars

14. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1471 (1989) (“Theories of the firm inform
and undergird corporate law, but they only intermittently appear as principal points in
corporate law discourse.”); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How does Delaware
Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1012 (1997) (“In part, my aim here is to
highlight the absence of any developed theory to explain how corporate law works.”).
15. See generally Reinier Kraakman et al., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, (2d ed.
2009) (consisting of several chapters providing physical anatomical studies of corporate law
in a comparative law context) [hereinafter Anatomy].
16. See id., § 1.4.3 n. 74 (setting forth much of the key scholarly literature on both sides
in this race to the top versus bottom debate).
17. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1448-49 (1992) (analyzing
the efforts of scholars: empirical studies to prove race to the top “value” as being
inconclusive).
18. PLI Panel, Delaware Law Developments 2015.
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like Rock,19 Fisch20 and Griffith21 see lots of indeterminacy and divergence.
With this debate also at a standstill, it is worth turning to a metaphysics of
corporate law, which could differentiate the unitary intelligible structures,
from the ever-changing sensible.
Beyond theoretical debates, this study also has utilities for regulatory
compliance. In the environmental regulation context, Ruhl and Salzman
have pointed to the problem of regulatory O2R1,4p*O12 pWW,U*O12d “Even if
the mechanisms of regulatory erosion described above are taking place, the
data presented . . . demonstrates that the forces of erosion have been
1(U,mPUL4UV oj *PU .,1WU++U+ 1R pWW,U*O12d” 22 Although an environmental
law study, corporate law clearly also has a regulatory dimension, which can
potentially accrete over time. 23
=PU .,O2WO.pL .,1oLU4 1R ,UQ)Lp*1,j pWW,U*O12 O+ *Pp* “O2 p2 )2U2VO2Q
but futile search for the perfect, regulators ensure constant regulatory
confusion.”24 Undoubtedly, regulations, even theoretically good ones, could
confuse corporate regulated entities, like in the 1980s period of newly
expanded insider corporate law regulations, with the Unocal, Revlon and
Weinberger doctrines striking fear into the hearts of the insiders.25
?UWU2* W144U2*p,j +)4+ ). tULpmp,U Lpm:+ W),,U2* +O*)p*O12 p+
follows: <=PU Lpm Q1(U,2O2Q *PU ,U+.12+OoOLO*OU+ 1R VO,UW*1,+ Pp+
19. Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Doctrine and the Legacy of American Legal
Realism, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2019, 2052 (2015) (noting that legal realists see “widespread
indeterminacy in the law”).
20. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1076 (2000) (taking the position that “Delaware
courts also apply the relevant legal standards in a fact and case specific manner. As a result,
one court:s determination that a particular course of dealing was reasonable under the relevant
legal test provides little guidance to corporate actors about subsequent decisions applying the
same legal test”).
21. Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate
Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (2005) (arguing “that the emerging duty of good faith
is best understood as a rhetorical device rather than as a substantive standard”).
22. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory
Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 782 (2003).
23. For example, there are regulatory “laws that are mandatory, leaving parties no option
but to conform to them.” Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 1.4.1 (explaining the differences
between corporate law regulatory versus contractual functions).
24. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 22, at n. 224.
25. For example, “Van Gorkom triggered a backlash in corporate law over the fear that it
would chill the American entrepreneurial spirit within the boardroom.” Anne Tucker Nees,
Who’s the Boss? Unmaking Oversight Liability within the Corporate Power Puzzle, 35 DEL.
J. CORP L. 199, 210 (2010). More abstractly, “[t]hese [new] rules represent surprises for those
who complete transactions that become subject to subsequent challenge in an unexpected way
and are now subject to new risks of liability for participants.” William J. Carney, The Mystery
of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 17.
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oUW14U +1 4)VVLUV *Pp*f O2W,UVOoLjf 12U Wp2:* QU* p W12+O+*U2*
answer to the most basic corporate law question of how many
fiduciary duties directors have--if you ask Delaware lawyers, the
answer can range anywhere from two to five!: 26
To deal with this problem of regulatory confusion, Ruhl and Salzman
offer compliance education as a solution:
The first focuses on ways regulators can increase their emphasis
on compliance facilitation, primarily through good-old-fashioned
education. While a salutary objective, this approach faces the two
following problems: there is too much law on the books for the
human mind to absorb; and, more pointedly, it is difficult to teach
system-based compliance challenges that do not appear on the
books.27
Unlike in highly regulatory securities or environmental areas, each with
sprawling federal agency regulations requiring virtually endless compliance
education, less regulatory (and predominantly contractual) Delaware
corporate law principles can be reduced to a few critical fundamental truths,
as I will show.28 Hence, if anywhere, a metaphysics of corporate law could
help alleviate the relatively narrow and limited range of regulatory problems
in corporate law.
Finally, a metaphysics of corporate law could be useful for judges and
policymakers. Haupt points out how comparative law could assist other
states or nations turning to Delaware for lessons, 29 which could, in turn,
improve the efficacy of the corporate law regulatory free markets. For
example, as the real seat doctrine erodes in the EU, perhaps this article could
lay the groundwork for a value Delaware of the EU (which has not yet
happened according to most European commentators). 30 In America, even
26. Id. at 14.
27. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 22, at 831.
28. Delaware corporate law, while having a regulatory dimension, is also quite
contractual, and thus has fewer regulations than straight regulatory areas. Often, “corporate
law simply offers a standard form contract that the parties can adopt, at their option, in whole
or in part.” Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 1.4.1. But, I observe how some states: corporate
laws could be somewhat more “regulatory.”
29. See generally Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Company Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006)
(discussing the utilities of comparative corporate law). In particular, not all states can do what
Delaware does, given the business specialization of Delaware:s expert Court of Chancery.
See Michael P. Dooley & Michael D. Goldman, Some Comparisons between the Model
Business Corporation Act and the Delaware General Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 737,
765 (“The end result has been greater [Delaware] expertise and predictability than in other
jurisdictions, especially given the limited number of judges to whom a case can be assigned.”).
30. See Marco Ventoruzzo, “Cost-Based” and “Rules-Based” Regulatory Competition:
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if Delaware law is dominant, with multi-forum litigation on the increase,31
thus requiring a non-Delaware state court to decide on Delaware corporate
law substantive matters, this study could possibly help those alternative
states understand the fundamentals of the Delaware substantive approach,
yielding improved outcomes.
Even for Delaware judges, the experts of their own jurisprudence, a
comprehensive metaphysics of corporate law could have utility. History has
shown how, when under pressure and facing urgent time constraints,
Delaware courts occasionally adopt slightly imperfect new doctrines, which,
although on the right track, require some recalibrations. For example, in the
1980s, while it was likely correct for the court to empower management
takeover defenses at the height of corporate raider problems, 32 Unocal33 at
RO,+* ).PULV 4p2pQU4U2*:+ p2*O-democratic coercive takeover defense,
before only later fixing that pro-board mistake by adding more proshareholder democracy layers into the Unocal analysis.34 Hopefully, a
metaphysics of corporate law could minimize these rare problems in the
future.
C. Toward a metaphysics of corporate law
Aristotle gave a pragmatic approach for zeroing in on metaphysical
inquiries, from which I draw.
Since knowledge is thought to consist in the knowledge of causes,
Aristotle articulates a theory of four senses in which a thing might

Markets for corporate Charters in the U.S. and the E.U., 3 N.Y.U. J. L & BUS. 91 (2006)
(noting a lack of jurisdictional competition in the EU, even after the partial fall of the “real
seat” doctrine).
31. “The two most dramatic corporate law changes of the past fifteen years have been the
increasing federal role in corporate law and the advent of multi-forum litigation.” David
Skeel, The Bylaw Puzzle in Delaware Corporate Law, 72 BUS. LAW. 1, 4 (2016).
32. Takeovers had troubling consequences for corporate constituencies. Managers and
employees were fired, pre-existing creditors subordinated and even shareholders squeezed in
coercive bids. For example, Bratton observes how “the takeover challenged not only
management:s security of position, but also its discretionary power . . . .” Bratton, supra note
14, at 1528. “In the popular mind, Bergman says, lawyers who facilitated takeovers were just
as responsible for the consequences as the raiders who counted the money. And Hollywood
quickly cast the excess of Wall Street as Gordon Gekko, and called in the supporting cast of
pin-striped lawyers.” Lisa Stansky, M&A is Back . . . Only this time, mergers and
acquisitions have a kinder, gentler face, 83 MAR A.B.A. J. 61, 61-62 (1997). Beyond all this,
takeovers typically result in control shifts, and thus had possible anti-democracy implications
for the Delaware “independent” corporation system.
33. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
34. See infra Section IV (explaining the evolution of the Unocal doctrine).
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be explained: the formal cause (what it is), material cause (what
it is made of), efficient cause (what brought it about), and final
(what is its purpose). 35
Given the difficulties of the first and last formal inquiries, I begin with
a discussion of corporate history, then its organizational and legal matter,
before turning to the more metaphysical inquiries of corporate law, first in
Delaware and ultimately beyond Delaware.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FIRM
=1 +PO2U LOQP* 12 *PU pWpVU4OW VUop*U po1)* *PU 2p*),U 1R tULpmp,U:+
consciousness, this Article conducts a historical analysis of key events across
seven epochs of 20th and 21st century American history, showing the
O2RL)U2*OpL RpW*1,+ *Pp* UO*PU, +mpjUV 1, .,U+U,(UV tULpmp,U:+ .1+*),U+f
which have been as constant as pliant, like any well-adapted biological
organism in a large ecosystem.
A. First Epoch & 1890 & Great Depression
",p**12 oULOU(U+ *Pp* *PU V14O2p2* 41VU,2 “4p2pQU4U2*-centered . . .
Lp,QU W1,.1,p*U U2*O*OU+”36 came into existence around 1890, building up
gradually to become the Berle-Means corporation, meaning a corporation
that more and more separated shareholder capital and managerial control. 37
]2 *PO+ .U,O1Vf mOVULj VO+.U,+UV +Pp,UP1LVO2Q “.p**U,2+ . . . enhanced
management discretion . . . d” 38
A W1).LU 1R *PO2Q+ V,1(U pLL 1R *PO+d “AW*1,+ 12 *PU Wp.O*pL 4p,MU*+
withdrew from active participation in corporate management because they
+pm *PU4+UL(U+ p+ LpWMO2Q O2 2UWU++p,j Uk.U,*O+Uf” 39 probably due to large
organizations requiring a highly complex strategic science that specialized
management, armed with inside information, alone can possess. Second,
“r)q2VU, W12Vitions of widely dispersed information and the need for speed
in decisions, [managerial] authoritative control at the tactical level [became]
U++U2*OpL R1, +)WWU++d” 40 "pO2o,OVQU WpLL+ *PO+ +j+*U4 “p)*P1,O*j-based
35. Popkin, supra note 2, at 73.
36. Bratton, supra note 14, at 1476.
37. Id. at 1487-88 (“Ownership of capital and control of the firm became completely
separate.”).
38. Id. at 1492.
38. Id. at 1492.
39. Id. at 1487.
40. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers,
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VUWO+O12 4pMO2Qf” 41 which is very similar to viewing managers as the heroic
captains of their ships.
At this period in history, highly passive, widely dispersed shareholders
could do very little to check and balance managers.
The conventional wisdom, moreover, held that investors had to go
along whether they liked it or not: there was a collective action
.,1oLU4d ;2VU, *PU <7pLL >*,UU* ?)LUf: O2VO(OV)pL +*1WMP1LVU,+
never found it cost-effective to challenge the tenure of an
ineffective management group; selling the shares was the best
course of action. This unspoken understanding governed
management/investor relations until the late 1970s. 42
What scholars call strong managers and weak shareholders obviously
increased vertical agency problems, meaning situations where managers
would too sharply pursue their own self-interest, against the interests of their
shareholder principles.43 However, this epoch of growing, as well as more
and more legitimized managerial power, concluded with the systemically
threatening Great Depression. 44
B. Second Epoch & Great Depression & Post-War Years
Presumably, the Great Depression was the first event to cast serious
doubts on the credibility of firm management, resulting in a federal
regulatory backlash. With this first round of post-depression major fears
regarding the integrity of the firm, Bratton observes that, in the 1930s, the
“federal government supplemented state law with the federal [pro+Pp,UP1LVU,q +UW),O*OU+ Lpm+d” 45 More important for state corporate law, in
the post-war years, the American corporation regained its strong footing and
reached unprecedented prosperity. In this period, scholars observed
continuing growth and insulation from global competition.46
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 783 n. 63 (2006).
41. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An
Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL J. CORP. L. 979, 1055 (1998).
42. Bratton, supra note 14, at 1492-93.
43. See Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 1.1 (observing how “separation of ownership from
control,” in turn, “has sharpened the management-shareholder agency problem”).
44. See Edwin F. Gay, The Great Depression, 10 FOREIGN AFF. 529, 529, 531 (1932)
(detailing the state of national and international economic affairs following the American
Depression); Eugene N. White, The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 Revisited, 4 J.
ECON. PERSP. 67, 68 (1990) (describing how vertical price drops on “Black Tuesday, October
29” led to the Great Depression).
45. Bratton, supra note 14, at 1493.
46. See WILLIAM CARNEY, Motivations for Mergers, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 10
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C. Third Epoch & Post-War Years & 1980s
It is worth mentioning (not often mentioned in business scholarship) the
rise of idealism in the 1960s period, where there were various grass-roots
movement struggles for social progress in a variety of areas, like, say,
culturally in the arts, civil rights, anti-discrimination, or in more businessrelated areas, new laws like the neutral (neither favoring management nor
hostile raiders) tender offer-focused Williams Act in the federal securities
Lpmf 1, U(U2 *PU ,O+U 1R \)+*OWU =,pj21,:+ .,1-consumer products strict
liability (over the negligence theory) in state tort law (at least in California).
Notably more relevant to corporate law, Cary, a famous law professor and
R1,4U, >a! !PpO,4p2f Rp41)+Lj WpLLUV 1)* tULpmp,U Lpm:+ pLLUQUV ,pWU *1
the bottom in 1974, 47 which brought the matter of possible corporate law
regulatory deficiencies to the attention of the courts and society.
Ideals in this period also coincided with new serious social problems
brewing that threatened to destroy, or at least hinder, our society and
prosperity. Although our American post-war prosperity years made it seem
like the management was perfect and had unstoppable efficiency, blind trust
in the firm (and management) ultimately culminated in several kinds of
disastrous managerial inefficiency mistakes, such as fake earnings growth,
conglomerate empire building, and poor investing strategies. 48 However,
during this pre-1980s period, these problems were largely masked by an
illusion of perfect prosperity.
D. Fourth Epoch & 1980s & Early 1990s
That post-war American firm efficiency mirage was met with much
pain during the takeover wave of the 1980s. 49 In this hostile period, hostile
raiders used evolving hostile tender offer tactics to take over inefficient
corporations, with the idea of profiting from turning around firm
inefficiencies.50 Though in theory efficient value deals, these takeovers
simultaneously created much pain for the various corporate constituencies. 51
(4th ed. 2016) [hereinafter Carney].
47. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
48. See Carney, supra note 46, at 10-11.
49. See id. at 12 (“By the 1980s the hostile takeover had become commonplace.”);
Bratton, supra note 14, at 1520 (“In the more aggressive market for corporate control that
appeared after 1980, almost all corporations became potential subjects for attack.”).
50. See id. at 13 (noting that sell-offs of busted up conglomerates were worth more apart
than whole).
51. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (highlighting various negative
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With a masked social problem suddenly uncovered and brought to light
R1, pLLf 4p2pQU4U2*:+ W,UVOoOLO*j mp+ 12WU pQpO2 Wp+* into doubt.52 However,
hostile raiders, viewed as the Gordon Gekkos of the world, engendered equal
skepticism.53 As a result, the whole society was in a state of total confusion
on the takeover question. Horizontally, controlling shareholders were now
also seen with more suspicions after the freeze-outs of the 1970s.54
E. Fifth epoch & Early 1990s & Early 2000s
Relatively quickly, this first 1980s hostile takeover wave calmed down
by the early 1990s. 55 During this era, several new forces seriously increased
corporate efficiency pressures and weakened vertical managerial power.
First, with the stick, as actual hostile activity diminished, society was
nonetheless left with the omnipresent specter threat of hostile activity, with
a new market for corporate control. This meant that, should management
revert to its inefficient ways, the markets would quickly notice and check
management with future turnaround-oriented takeovers.56
Hence, the
market for corporate control was highly correlated with a new emerging
culture of corporate efficiency. 57 Bratton observed how efficiency alleviated
vertical agency problems. 58
Equally important, with the carrot, to foster this new culture of firm

consequences, such as the firing of managers and employees and the subordination of preexisting creditors).
52. See Bratton, supra note 14, at 1497 (noting that anti-managerialists cried out for a
<public: firm theory, analogizing corporate power to government power).
53. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining that the excess profits on Wall
Street were quickly type casted as Gordon Gekko, a regrettable enemy for corporations, in
Hollywood).
54. See Christian A. Krebs, Freeze-Out Transactions in Germany and the U.S.: A
Comparative Analysis, 13 GERMAN L.J. 941, 945 (2012) (noting an increase in controlling
shareholder freeze-out activity in the early 1970s).
55. See Carney, supra note 46, at 13 (observing a decline in LBOs and raider financing
in the early 1990s). Most deals then became friendly strategically-driven deals. See id. at 1821 (motivations for mergers).
56. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 78 J. POL.
ECON. 110, 113 (1965) (“The lower the stock price, relative to what it could be with more
efficient management, the more attractive the takeover becomes to those who believe that
they can manage the company more efficiently.”).
57. See id. at 112 (“A fundamental premise underlying the market for corporate control
is the existence of a high positive correlation between corporate managerial efficiency and the
market price of shares of that company.”); Carney, supra note 46, at 13 (observing a change
in board efficiency culture).
58. See Bratton, supra note 14, at 1517-18 (arguing that takeovers will remove inefficient
managers).
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efficiency, rewards strategies (carrots) became more predominant. 59 Some
key examples of rewards strategies include stock options, restricted stock,
and stock appreciation rights. 60 Although critics argue that rising executive
compensation packages resulted in possibly unjust compensation of
managers,61 those mechanisms in theory better align the vertical interests of
corporate managers with shareholders. 62 If vertical interests are better
aligned, then vertical agency and inefficiency problems are presumably
further alleviated. 63
F. Sixth Epoch & Early 2000s
If the 1990s are significant for weakening vertical managerial powers,
the 2000s are significant for the rise of shareholder power, as the 2000s
4p,MUV p +POR* O2 +Pp,UP1LVU,+: 2p*),U+d "j Jbbbf ROR*j-one percent of all
stock was owned by institutional investors.64 Institutional shareholders 65 are
larger as well as more powerful and coordinated investors,66 in comparison
mO*P *PU mOVULj VO+.U,+UV “4p p2V .p” .)oLOW +Pp,UP1LVU,+ 1R *PU "U,LUMeans yesteryear. While in my view the top investors of yesteryear like the
famous Benjamin Graham were always very intelligent, the old generation
59. See Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 3.5 (showing that rewards compensation is typically
over half of management compensation packages)
60. See id. (describing types of rewards strategies).
61. See David I. Walker, A Tax Response to the Executive Pay Problem, 93 B.U. L. REV.
325, 327 (2013) (arguing that executive compensation contributes to growing wealth
inequality).
62. See Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 3.5 (“The theory, of course, is that optimallystructured pay packages can align the interests of managers with those of shareholders as a
class.”); Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 547, 577 (2003) (“Tying up the proportion of the director:s
personal wealth in stock of the corporation thus creates a hostage, aligning the directors:
interests with those of shareholders.”). But see Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 3.5 (showing
that empirical literature is uncertain about the effectiveness of alignment of interest
mechanisms).
63. See Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 3.5 (Rewards can “substitute for direct shareholder
monitoring when shareholders are dispersed.”).
64. Norman S. Poser, Liability of Broker-Dealers for Unsuitable Recommendations to
Institutional Investors, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1493, 1501 (2001).
65. See Theodor Baums, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate
Governance in the United States and Germany, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 31, 58 (2005) (explaining
that institutional shareholders include insurance companies, banks, mutual funds, pension
funds, private equity and hedge funds).
66. See Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 3.1 (showing that collective action facilitates the
shareholder franchise). ] 1o+U,(U *Pp* O2+*O*)*O12pL O2(U+*1,+ Wp2 “W11,VO2p*U” UO*PU, *P,1)QP
their trade group ISS, by discussing 4p**U,+ mO*P 12U p21*PU, )2VU, .1++OoLU RUVU,pL “.,1kj
,)LU+” UkU4.*O12+ 1, U(U2 O2 WU,*pO2 Wp+U+ +O4.Lj R1LL1mO2Q *PU LUpV 1R p21*PU, pW*O(O+*d
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LpWMUV *PU 4)+W)Lp*),U 1R *1Vpj:+ O2+*O*)*O12pL O2(U+*1,+d A.p,* R,14 *PU
nature of institutional shareholders in themselves, they were likely greatly
aided by the rise of the internet, further empowering their communicational
means of both coordination and shareholder fiduciary duty lawsuits on
governance matters. 67 “r>qcholars have argued that institutional investor
pW*O(O+4 Wp2 QO(U ,UpL *UU*P *1 +Pp,UP1LVU, W12*,1Ld” 68 All this, in theory,
further alleviates vertical and (even horizontal) agency problems. 69
Then, “[i]n the early 2000s, society [nonetheless] witnessed the collapse
1R a2,12d X1* +),.,O+O2QLjf <r4qp2j LUQpL +WP1Lp,+ 4p,M *PU RpLL 1R a2,12 p+
a momentous event in our legal a2V UW1214OW PO+*1,jd:”70 I observe that the
collapse of Enron probably created both local corporate risks and even
systemic risks to the broader society. Hence, Enron obviously resulted in
another management discredit. Skeel observes the result of this pU,O1V p+ “a
marked expansion of federal regulation of corporate law [with SarbanesOxley], and an accompanying shrinkage of the portion of corporate law that
O+ ,UQ)Lp*UV oj tULpmp,U p2V 1*PU, +*p*U+d” 71
G. Seventh Epoch & Financial Crisis of 2008 & Present
The latest period is characterized by increasing non-Delaware
alternative regulator pressures at both the federal and state levels. Roe has
),QUVf “[c]onsider not just the horizontal relationship among competing
states, nor just the possibility of a solitary Delaware as a pure monopolist,
but also the vertical relationship of a vast federal authority that could, and
1WWp+O12pLLj V1U+f VO+.LpWU *PU Lpm4pMO2Q 1R *PU LO**LU +*p*U+ oUL1m O*d” 72
>MUUL *P)+ 1o+U,(U+ *Pp* “[t]he two most dramatic corporate law changes of
the past fifteen years have been the increasing federal role in corporate law
and the advent of multi-R1,)4 LO*OQp*O12d” 73
Toward the end of the latter half of the first decade of the new
millennium, American society witnessed the systemically threatening

67. I came across these internet implications notions in a discussion with students in my
seminar.
68. Bainbridge, supra note 62, at 571.
69. See Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 2.1 (“[A]gency problems in public corporations
[were] exacerbated, due to the inability of the shareholder principals to coordinate and monitor
agents, endowed with great discretion.”).
70. Seth Chertok, Cracking the Problem of Finders & An Empirical and Computational
Analysis, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1021, 1073 (2016).
71. Skeel, supra note 31, at 2.
72. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2499 (2005).
73. Skeel, supra note 31, at 4.
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financial crisis of 2008.74 >MUUL 21*U+ P1mf “rpqR*U, *PU JbbE RO2p2WOpL W,O+O+f
Congress further federalized state corporate law with the Dodd-`,p2M AW*d”75
“=PU 41,U !12Q,U++ O2*,)VU+ 12 +*p*U W1,.1,p*U Lpm T the more issues are
dictated by federal law T the less Delaware incorporation has to offer.
tULpmp,U *PU,UR1,U Pp+ p +*,12Q O2*U,U+* O2 MUU.O2Q !12Q,U++ p* opjd” 76
Another key event in the last decade is the presence of state multi-forum
LO*OQp*O12d “]2 *PU .p+* VUWpVUf *PU +Pp,UP1LVU,+ 1f Delaware corporations
have brought an increasing number and percentage of their lawsuits against
W1,.1,p*U VO,UW*1,+ 1, 1RROWU,+ O2 +*p*U+ 1*PU, *Pp2 tULpmp,Ud” 77 Skeel
1o+U,(U+ *Pp* “rmqPp* +U*+ tULpmp,U p.p,* O+ O*+ +1.PO+*OWp*UV W1,.1,p*U Lpm
judiciary and its rich supply of precedents on any conceivable corporate law
O++)Ud” 78 Parallel to the federal law issue, Delaware therefore has a strong
interest in keeping multi-forum litigation at bay. 79
H. Conclusion
Ultimately, what appears to drive R1,mp,V +*p*U W1,.1,p*U Lpm:+
historical momentum are key events that affect regulated entity internal
governance (money and power) relationships, like ambiguous raiders
coming into the corporation, or the rise of institutional investor more
muscular shareholders. Or, indirectly, innovations such as the internet,
which changed the communicational dynamics among those who are inside
the corporation, could also be highly relevant. Beyond the regulated entity
side, corporate law is also shaped by regulator pressures, with the rise of both
alternative state and federal checks on Delaware law.
III. THE ANATOMY OF THE FIRM
A. What are firms?
Virtually all kinds of firm entities aggregate capital to profit from
valuable goods and services. However, only corporations have five business
characteristics as a default – “hKg LUQpL .U,+12pLO*jf hJg LO4O*UV LOpoOLO*jf hIg

74. See Chertok, supra note 70, at 1073 (demonstrating how the financial crisis posed
systemic risks).
75. Skeel, supra note 31, at 2.
76. Id. at 15.
77. Id. at 2.
78. Id. at 20.
79. See id. (“If shareholders started filing their lawsuits in other states, the Delaware
engine would soon begin to struggle.”).
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transferable shares, (4) centralized management under a board structure, and
hGg +Pp,UV 1m2U,+PO. oj W12*,Oo)*O2Q Wp.O*pLd” 80 “=1QU*PU,f *PUj 4pMU *PU
corporation uniquely attractive for organizing productive activity [especially
for the typical Delaware public company]d”81 Of course, corporations could
p* *O4U+ “W12*,pW*” pmpj R,14 WU,*pO2 1R +)WP “VURp)L*+f” o)* *Pp* *j.OWpLLj
would not happen in the standard public company, except for certain stock
transfer restrictions. 82
B. What do corporations do?
What a corporation does is fundamentally its spirit. In short,
corporations use their structures to contract either internally or externally.
Internally speaking,
[i]n the economics literature, a firm is often characterized as a
<2Uk)+ 1R W12*,pW*+:d . . . It is often invoked simply to emphasize
that most of the important relationships within a firm T including,
O2 .p,*OW)Lp,f *P1+U p412Q *PU RO,4:+ 1m2ers, managers, and
employees T are essentially contractual in character, and hence
based on consent, rather than involving some form of extra
contractual command-and-control authority. 83
] 1o+U,(U *Pp* 41+* O2*U,2pL W12*,pW*O2Q O+ +O4.Lj “oOQ o1j” W1,.1,p*U
governance agreements on the allocation of money and power issues.
ak*U,2pLLj +.UpMO2Qf RO,4+ p,U pL+1 2Uk)+U+ R1, W12*,pW*+f “O2 *PU +U2+U
that a firm serves, fundamentally, as the common counterparty in numerous
contracts with suppliers, employees, and customers, coordinating the actions
1R *PU+U 4)L*O.LU .U,+12+ *P,1)QP UkU,WO+U 1R O*+ W12*,pW*)pL ,OQP*+d” 84 These
“2Uk)+U+” p,U Q11V *1 *PU Uk*U2* *Pp* *PUj build goodness, prosperity,
freedom, stability and balance for the larger society.
Apart from these corporate internalities nexuses, at times corporations
can also impose externalities, most of which are unintentional, but
occasionally intentional criminal scandals can arise. In an imperfect world
invariably filled with some amount of unfortunate accidents, unintentional
externalities, per economists, can either be optimal or sub-optimal (or
reasonable versus unreasonable), essentially meaning whether or not, on
80. Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 1.2.
81. Id.
82. For example, securities laws in certain cases require restricted stock after offerings.
Sometimes, director and officer stock is also restricted to create better alignment of interest
incentives in rewards compensation.
83. Id. at § 1.2.1.
84. Id.
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balance, the externalities are truly reasonably necessary (done in the best
possible, most ethical and safest way), while still achieving (and hopefully
not significantly over-deterring) imperative utilities that build goodness,
prosperity, freedom, stability and balance for the larger society (and avoiding
some of the social problems from prior, less prosperous eras).85 In simple
language, economists believe that some externalities are just life, but too
4)WP p,U )2U*POWpL p2V U(U2 “2U*” )2UW1214OWpLd
C. Who is the corporation?
A -)U+*O12 1R mPU,U 41,U m1,M O+ *1 oU V12U O+ 21* “mPp* V1U+ the firm
V1#” o)* ,p*PU, “mP1 O+ *PU RO,4#” 7O*P p R)2W*O12pLLj R1W)+UV p..,1pWP
inspired by Greek metaphysics, this Article maps out natural
correspondences between the legal entities of corporate firms and the
biological entities of society, such as a real person versus a legal person,
individually and collectively.
Many have relationships with the firm, but firm specialists (particularly
in Delaware) naturally categorize those parties into internal versus external
and view only the internal parties as part of the firm. Delaware law tends to
view only two flavors of internal parties, along what I call the vertical axis
(management versus shareholders), and the horizontal axis (controllers 86
versus minority shareholders p+ mULL p+ “WLp++” (U,+)+ “WLp++”). Outside of
these two internal axes, virtually all other parties with firm relationships are
viewed as situated along a separate external axis, such as creditors, preferred
stock, employees, suppliers, customers, charitable beneficiaries and even the
government/society.
Apart from the corporation being its people, the corporation is also an
entity and hence legal person unto itself. Obviously, corporations can own
property and contract like real people. Moreover, corporations can receive
Constitutional governmental protections, at times, like a real person. For
85. Economists usually argue for the law promoting “optimal” externalities (on the
whole) and only deterring externalities when “sub-optimal.” Different types of temperaments,
of course, might have differing opinions on balancing results, depending on whether they are
strictly economics oriented or gravitating toward more common sense activist ideals of
fairness (even with the latter being somewhat amorphous).
86. Delaware courts view control either as majority ownership, or a significantly high
percentage falling slightly shy thereof, but with what I call muscling or dominating, meaning
perhaps telling management what to do, or other overly aggressive tactics in conflicted
situations. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc. 638 A.2d 1110, 1114 (Del.
1994) (“For a dominating relationship to exist in the absence of controlling stock ownership,
a plaintiff must allege domination by a minority shareholder through actual control of
corporation conduct.”).
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+14U *O4Uf W1,.1,p*O12+ Pp(U PpV `OR*P A4U2V4U2* “=pMO2Q+” .,1.U,*j
rights protections. More recently, the Citizens United case has even held that
a corporation is a legal person for First Amendment purposes, with rights to
speak freely like a regular person. 87 7Pp*U(U, 12U:+ p**O*)VU *1mp,V *PU
personality of corporations, 88 it is important to consider why corporations
might anatomically be viewed as real people, unto themselves, apart from
the aggregation of their inner individuals separately?
Metaphysically, it seems that an aggregation of bodies will often have
body-like anatomical structures. The body-like cells form the human body
and the aggregated human bodies form a kind of gestalt super-body.
8U2*1,)ii1 U* pLd 1o+U,(UV *Pp* “r*qPU m1,V <W1,.1,p*O12: W14U+ R,14 *PU
Zp*O2 m1,V <W1,.)+f: 4Up2O2Q <o1Vjd:” 89 But why? First, a corporation is to
some extent a derivative of us, who made the corporation, hence it makes
sense that it would resemble us. Second, Heraclitus did observe that
existence itself would reflect “p2 1,VU,UVf ,p*O12pL p2V )2OROUV ,UpLO*jd” 90
Hence, in theory, one sphere could cross-correspond to another (in a prior
article, I observed how economic systemic risks likely work just like a
physical network of metal discs and chains, and Judge Andrews was famous
for his waterbodies allegory revealing the fundamental nature of proximate
causation in Palsgraf).91
I observe that the corporation has observable very similar real personlike anatomical structures in many respects. Most obviously, corporations
have a life process, just like a real person. They are birthed into this world
mO*P *PUO, “R1,4p*O12f” 92 *PU2 Pp(U *PUO, LORU mO*P *PUO, “LUQpL .U,+12pLO*j”
(discussed above) and one day perhaps their death should “LO-)OVp*O12” be

87. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010)
(“[T]he Government may not suppress political speech based on the speaker:s corporate
identity.”).
88. See Anthony J. Gaughan, The Futility of Contribution Limits in the Age of Super
PACS, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 755, 774 (2012) (observing Citizens United as a very controversial
position, possibly opening the floodgates of special interest groups). My belief is that the
majority and dissents in that case basically split on the issue of corporate aggregations of
people having their free rights to speak (just like an individual person or even a political
party), versus those powerful purely business-driven aggregations (which in contrast to
political parties are not truly ideological in competence) possibly hindering the democratic
political process, as, say, President Jefferson long ago might have feared.
89. Marco Ventoruzzo et al., COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW, 131 (2015 ed.).
90. See Popkin, supra note 2, at 11.
91. See Chertok, supra note 70; Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y.
1928) (using the analogy of disturbing a body of water to describe how multiple causes can
have overlapping effects).
92. Del Code. Ann. Tit. 8 § 101 (charter filing creates incorporation).
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triggered.93 In contrast to humans, corporations are conditionally immortal,
+P1)LV “LO-)OVp*O12” 2U(U, oU *,OQQU,UVd
Once birthed, if we want to understand the corporate body, the starting
point is to intuit that bodies are always organized, with certain prominences
and functionalities, in their skeletons and organs. The corporate body is no
exception. While its anatomy in many respects is very much human-like, as
one might imagine for an alien species, there are some divergent corporate
biological rules. Namely, a corporation has much fewer core bones than a
human, and given corporate organs can have simultaneously overlapping
functionalities.
First, I view the skeleton of the corporation largely along the lines of its
internal vertical and horizontal axes, forming a delta shape if one were to
draw it out.94 These vertical and horizontal axes can be thought of as
“connected” with fragile joints rather than hard bones. I say joints since
empirically those links are very vulnerable spots, and hence the focus of the
LO12:+ +Pp,U 1R W1,.1,p*U ,UQ)Lp*O12+d 95 If iterating corporate law issues, one
W1)LV U(U2 O4pQO2U tp 8O2WO:+ Rp41)+ icosidodecahedron drawing (where
“UpWP RpWU O+ p)Q4U2*UV mO*P p .j,p4OV W14.1+UV 1R U-)OLp*U,pL
*,Op2QLU+”gd96
Bodies always have skin delimitations, dividing the inside from the
outside. The corporate skin is a mix of limited liability97 plus entity
shielding.98 Easterbrook & Fischel observe how much all this does for the
corporate system, by facilitating wealth and economics efficiency for the
society.99 With this corporate skin in place, external creditors usually cannot
93. Del Code. Ann. Tit. 8 § 275 (dissolution statute).
94. Of course, for the Germans, who see workers on the inside (which I will discuss in
part II), there could be a different kind of delta formation. One might think of a bee farm.
Should we view the farm only in terms of the worker bees bringing in honey and the bee
keeper distributing it out, or also as the drones working with that honey?
95. See Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 2.1 (“Indeed, much of corporate law can usefully
be understood as responding to three principal sources of opportunism: conflicts between
managers and shareholders, conflicts among shareholders, and conflicts between shareholders
and the corporation:s other constituencies, including creditors and employees.”).
96. See Dirk Huylebrouck, Lost in Triangulation: Leonardo da Vinci’s Mathematical
Slip-Up, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, (Mar. 29, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article
/davinci-mathematical-slip-up/ [https://perma.cc/AXA5-ZLWQ] (describing an error that da
Vinci made in his polyhedron drawing for Luca Pacioli:s book); George W. Hart, Leonardo
da Vinci’s Polyhedra, https://www.georgehart.com/virtual-polyhedra/leonardo.html [https://
perm.cc/M79E-34FA] (describing da Vinci:s drawings of polyhedral).
97. See Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 1.2.2 (creditors typically have claims only against
the firm and not the individual shareholders).
98. See id. (“Entity shielding protects the assets of the firm from the creditors of the
firm:s owners. . . .”).
99. Frank Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
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go after internal parties, and internal creditors usually cannot go after the
corporation.100 But like with human skin, that corporate skin is not made of
metal, and thus could be pierced in extreme cases under, for example, the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.101
Inside the corporate body, different firm actors have different organlike functionalities.
The shareholders function as the mouthpiece of the corporation.
Managers are always subject to periodic accountability at shareholder
votes.102 Hence, management must ultimately bow to the voice of its people.
Further, today, as shareholders have become more institutional, 103 those more
powerful and coordinated shareholders have essentially also become the
RO,4:+ 4)+WLU+d A+ ] +P1m Lp*U,f 12U m1)Ld expect institutional shareholders
both to make trouble for managers on bad strategic decisions and to influence
independent committees to fight for more shareholder short term value in
vertical (or even horizontal) disloyal deal situations. Although rare in the
United States, some corporations might have controlling shareholders, who
can be thought of like a queen bee in a bee colony, controlling by herself the
shareholder voice of the corporate people.
Managers function as several kinds of organs all at once. First,
managers are the corporate eyes. Only managers should have full access to
seeing the proprietary inside information of the firm. 104 Equally important,
managers function as the corporate brains. Only managers are the true
intellectual masterminds of their strategic long-term value science. 105 The
combination of eyes and brains make management the perfect captains of
their ships.
Management can also function as the corporate immune system. As the
CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985) (explaining the economics theories behind corporate limited liability).
100. See Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 1.2.2 (“Together, they set up a regime of <asset
partitioning: whereby business assets are pledged as security to business creditors, while the
personal assets of the business:s owners are reserved for the owners: personal creditors.”).
101. See id. at § 5.3.1.2 (“[A]ll our jurisdictions permit courts to <pierce the corporate veil:
in extreme circumstances; that is, to hold controlling shareholders or the controllers of
corporate groups personally liable for the company:s debts.”).
102. See id. at § 1.2.4 (stating that the board is typically elected by the shareholders).
103. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing the recent increase in the
number of institutional investors).
104. See Bainbridge, supra note 62, at 558 (observing how no other corporate constituency
has insider competence).
105. See James Mackintosh, In the Long Run, Fear of Short-Termism is Mostly Bunk,
WALL STREET J. (May 10, 2018, 12:57 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-the-long-runshort-termism-backlash-is-mostly-bunk-1525969223
[https://perma.cc/X38U-6GKD]
(arguing that managers are functional as long term strategists, even though they are mistakenly
viewed as short term oriented).
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Revlon court noted, until Revlon mode kicks in, 106 managers are the natural
“VURU2VU,+ 1R *PU W1,.1,p*U op+*O12d” 107 That raises the question: what is
such a defender exactly? Facing an active hostile takeover threat,
4p2pQU4U2* 4OQP* pV1.* *pMU1(U, VURU2+U+f N)+* LOMU p +OWM P)4p2:+
immune system might kick into an acute mode. Moreover, even in non-acute
situations, ordinary strategic decisions could be viewed as fundamentally
defensive, with the advent of the market for corporate control threat, 108 since
efficient decisions ultimately keep hostile raiders at bay. However, the
W1,.1,p*U O44)2U +j+*U4 V1U+ 21* R)2W*O12 UkpW*Lj LOMU p P)4p2:+f +O2WU
outsider corporate invader organisms, if the firm is inefficient, can step in to
turn around inefficiencies. Hence, the corporate outsider invader has
legitimacy at times, thus society might want less corporate immune system
response. But even then, those inefficiency turnarounds often involve
painful pressures on so many corporate constituencies. 109 Thus, confused
about cure and disease, the corporate immune system needs to be regulated
carefully with the Delaware law of takeover defenses. 110
Interestingly, managers can even function as the mouthpiece and heart
of the corporation. Once electedf `O,+* A4U2V4U2* W1,.1,p*U “+.UUWP”
rights are in manpQU4U2*:+ VO+W,U*O12 – p2V 4p2pQU4U2*:+ N)VQ4U2* mOLL
also prepare many firm public disclosures. Further, many corporate acts of
4pQ2p2O4O*j *1mp,V *PU “Uk*U,2pL” pkO+ p,U LUQpLLj 4U,ULj “VO+W,U*O12p,jf”
hence management will often have the ultimate say on corporate “Q11V mOLL”
judgments.
In any insider (vertical or horizontal) disloyalty situation today, there
should be liver-like cleansing. Putting state together with federal and listing
rules, cleansing is used not only for conflicted deals, but also for thorny areas
such as audit, nomination and compensation committees. 111 In strictly state
106. See infra Section IV (analyzing corporate structures under Delaware law).
107. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
108. See supra Section II (outlining the historical development of Delaware corporate
law).
109. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the potential issues arising from
corporate takeovers).
110. See infra Section IV (analyzing corporate structures under Delaware law).
111. The law does not always use a liver for every problem, but only in problematic
possibly tainted areas, like say state corporate law insider disloyalty. See infra Section IV.
Under federal law, “Sarbanes-Oxley dictates independence requirements for the audit
committees of public companies.” Joseph Mead, Confidence in the Nonprofit Sector Through
Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Reforms, 106 MICH. L. REV. 881, 888 (2008). “The NYSE and NASD
AQ went beyond SOX: each exchange required that listing companies have (1) wholly
independent nominating/corporate governance and compensation committees and (2) a
majority independent board.” Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J.
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law disloyalty situations, depending on the precise nature of the conflicts,
that cleansing process consists of either an independent committee of
disinterested directors, disinterested minority shareholders, or both. 112
One issue that has arisen is whether the corporate liver can also cross
over into being the corporate eyes and brains, at least to some extent. With
disinterested parties typically lacking insider expertise,113 having no (or little)
significant stakes in the firm (in contrast to insiders with rewards
packages) 114 and considerable outside distractions, 115 those cleansing
structures could work purely like livers in the human body. They might well
clean out insider taint, but not necessarily with more intelligence. To make
matters worse, some scholars have even expressed some gadfly
consternations in the face of potential managerial disharmony problems. 116
However, there are also scholars who believe that there is smartness in
O2VU.U2VU2WUf +O2WU “rO2VU.U2VU2* VO,UW*1,+q L11M *1 1)*+OVU .U,R1,4p2WU
+OQ2pL+ p2V p,U LU++ Wp.*),UV oj *PU O2*U,2pL .U,+.UW*O(Ud” 117
No organism would be complete without a heart. Here, the court is the
ultimate conscience of the firm. Rock sees the court as fundamentally
41,pLO+*OWd “7Pj 4OQP* O* oU *Pp* tULpmp,U W1,.1,p*U Lpm +POU+ pmpj R,14
)+O2Q <Lpm+: *1 VU*U, opV oUPp(O1, p2V LUp2+f O2+*UpVf *1mp,V+ 41,pLO*j

CORP. L. 447, 458 (2008).
112. See infra Section IV (analyzing corporate structures under Delaware law).
113. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127,
179-80 (2010) (arguing that insiders have more context for information).
114. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
115. See Jeremy C. Kress, Board to Death: How Busy Directors Could Cause the Next
Financial Crisis, 59 B.C. L. REV. 877, 899 n.129 (2018) (observing the quantity of
disinterested party outside distractions and its possibly negative effect on firm value).
116. See Ventoruzzo, supra note 89, at 151 (“In the last few years, if not decades, the
number and relevance of independent (and/or outside) directors have risen in virtually all
developed nations. Is this desirable? Does this create the risk of a less collective board?”).
117. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 19502005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). If a
corporation believes in the liver as also the eyes and brains, it should think about ways to
cultivate the smartness of such organs. There are a few possible solutions. First, I could
imagine making “independent” directors privy to more “inside information.” Then, I could
imagine a corporation hiring a lot of “outside” strategic and financial experts, who would have
the skills to dissect that “inside information.” Then, insiders and outsiders could work
together on non-conflicted regular (or straight “strategic”) and even Unocal “defense”
decisions (a mix of “strategic” and “conflicted”), with vigorous Q&A about one another:s
views. Having limits on the “outsider:s” other time and business commitments could help
mitigate over-extendedness problems. Finally, the corporation could potentially consider
economics “alignment of interest” mechanisms/incentives to induce “competence.” Of
course, the more one tries to solve the “smartness” problem of “outside” directors, perhaps
the more such directors start to cross “the line” toward resembling “insiders.”
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*pLU+#” 118 The court then essentially has the ultimate mandatory say of what
is fair (versus unfair) inside the corporation. Apart from legal compulsion,
perhaps corporations also voluntarily trust 119 in the Delaware courts, who can
and do combine fairness with terrific economics sense,120 just like how many
corporations voluntarily adhere to some notion of corporate good will. 121 It
is also worth noting that the courts simultaneously appear to function like the
human endocrine system, carefully regulating the balance of the corporate
fundamental forces described in Section V.
In recent years, many have become interested in the gender, ethnic,
religious, sexual orientation and other diversity aspects of those who are
playing their corporate managerial roles. 122 Apart from being an antidiscrimination matter in itself, perhaps different from the human body where
most organ functionalities possibly share one gender and ethnicity, diversity
of corporate people, to some scholars, is relevant in terms of actual organ
functionalities. For example, Branson has argued that he believed that
femaLU VO,UW*1,+ PpV +).U,O1, “W14.U*U2WU+” 12 WU,*pO2 o)+O2U++ O++)U+d 123
D. The comparative perspective
The basic parts of the firm body remain remarkably constant throughout
both space and time, with a few exceptions. First, internally, in some
118. Rock, supra note 14, at 1101. However, as I show in Part II, the court will not be
bogged down sanctimoniously, if things are ultimately good, in the big picture.
119. The decision to be governed by Delaware corporate law is typically based on
corporation state “R1,4p*O12” WP1OWU+d
120. Perhaps some insurgent shareholder corporate social responsibility proposals seek
fairness but have a non-economically oriented agenda at times. While such proposals may be
gaining momentum, they “do not frequently garner a majority of support from voting
shareholders.” See Matthew J. Petrozziello, 13 RUTGERS BUS. L. REV. 22, 29-31 (2016)
(“CSR activists utilize shareholder proposals to leverage their way into constructive dialogue
with corporate management regarding social issues.”). Apart from such proposals, some
social responsibility funds now might also exert some limited fairness pressures on
corporations, via the markets. See Charles Schwab, Socially Conscious Funds List (2018), ht
tps://www.schwab.com/public/file/P-9561751/ [https://perma.cc/MXT9-9PJM] (describing
the ethical criteria of how some socially conscious funds invest).
121. By good will, I observe how many firms will often voluntarily try their very best to
enhance relationships with various corporate constituencies, like employees, customers,
suppliers, creditors, etc., all of which (at least to some extent) should clearly add long-term
value to any business.
122. Debates have ensued about the role of state and federal law in “mandating” such
board diversity, or at least promoting, say, public company board diversity “disclosures.” See,
e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Initiatives to Place Women on Corporate Board of Directors & A
Global Snapshot, 37 J. CORP. L. 793 (2012).
123. See id. (advocating for female emotional sensitivity, law-abidingness and consumer
preferences expertise).
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countries (like Germany), there is a two-tier board structure (one tier for
long-term oversights and another tier for day-to-day management), which
could potentially elongate the top delta joint, like a stretched forehead. 124
Moreover, apart from the delta parts themselves, the power relationships
among those parts can also shift in space and time. For example, in space,
controllers are both more powerful and common in Europe and Asia than in
the United States and the U.K.125 And within the United States, over time,
managers have somewhat weakened (yet still remained fairly strong) while
institutional shareholders have risen up by an order of magnitude. 126
Second, externally, different societies can philosophically view certain
grey area corporate constituencies (like employees or preferred
shareholders) as either internal or external, which I discuss in Part II.
IV. THE ANATOMY OF DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW
Before addressing the metaphysics of corporate law, I now take on the
task of simplifying the anatomy of corporate law by focusing on the
Delaware corporate law regulation of the essential parts of the firm. In short,
corporate law basically only has to modulate key axes governance (money
and power) issues, but more so internally than externally. Hence, I reduce
the gist of Delaware corporate law fiduciary duties to a simple series of
maxims. That the free markets should be honored in apportioning money
and power governance matters in the delta (and to a large extent, even in the
external lands), thus letting each do as he pleases (freely) with his quasinatural given market powers (property or contractual), unless abusive or
oppressive, with a typical steeper abuse threshold externally versus
internally. If the law desires to get involved, all jurisprudence usually relates
to some form of asking whether one node should ether facilitate or oppose
the other?

124. See Jens Dammann, The Mandatory Law Puzzle:
Redefining American
Exceptionalism in Corporate Law, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2014) (pointing out how the
German two-tier structure could have implications, such as slowing down (and thus deterring)
“takeover” attempts, or helping founders with closely held business succession planning).
125. See Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States
and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 698 (2005) (“The
Berle and Means corporation, with many dispersed shareholders and control in the hands of
management, is not a worldwide phenomenon. Outside Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, different
corporate ownership structures in which controlling shareholders have a large stake in the
company:s equity predominate.”).
126. See supra Section II (outlining the historical development of Delaware corporate
law).
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Both vertical and horizontal relationships (and their agency problems),
or body joint problems, are primarily dealt with either by governance or
regulations. Governance generally consists of default terms (on corporate
money or power issues), subject to contractual flexibility deviations in the
W1,.1,p*O12:+ Q1(U,2p2WU V1W)4U2*+ hLOMU *PU WPp,*U, 1, ojLpm+gf )2LU++
inequitable.127 Hence, governance is flexible but not 100% flexible.
Regulation refers to mandatory rules that must always be obeyed, without
flexible contracting rights.128 A2U W1)LV *PO2M 1R ,UQ)Lp*O12+ p+ *PU W1),*:+
fairness bottom line on governance (money and power) matters. That
rigidity was, and still is, balanced by opposing shield and carrot forces
(described below). Hence, regulations of so many forms are rigid but not
100% rigid.
A. The Vertical Axis
a.

Governance

Governance is controlled by quite a few cosmic vertical tensions and,
to a lesser extent, sometimes even some politics.129 Obviously, a corporation
requires a fundamental opposition between some level of mandatory Section
141(a) centralized management powers in large complex corporations
(especially on pure property decisions) 130 versus a corresponding mandatory
shareholder franchise in some form131 and other rights (especially on certain
key fundamental matters).132 As usual, that balance is achieved through a
127. See Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 1.4.1 (observing that corporate law default terms
are those that most parties would be expected to choose, subject to contracting).
128. See id. (distinguishing mandatory regulations from contractual corporate law).
129. See Skeel, supra note 31 (analyzing the proxy access and shareholder litigation
bylaws debates in Delaware law).
130. My experience is that these encompass matters such as certain strategic decisions,
bylaws amendments, stock issuances, dividends and stock repurchases, subject to certain
exceptions.
131. >*p*U+ *pMU VORRU,O2Q (OUm+ p+ *1 mPp* 4p**U,+ ,U-)O,U “(1*O2Qf” p2V *PU2 UkpW*Lj mPp*
“-)1,)4” p2V “.U,WU2*pQU” 1R +Pp,UP1LVU, p..,1(pL O+ 2UUVUV p+ mULL p+ mPU*PU, p2j “WLp++”
+P1)LV Pp(U “(1*O2Q” p2V “(U*1” ,OQP*+ hmPOWPf O2 WU,*pO2 Wp+U+f Wp2 oU +)oNUW* *1 +14U LO4O*UV
VUQ,UU 1R “W12*,pW*)pL” 41VOROWp*O12+gd AR W1),+Uf W1),*+ pL+1 mp2* -)pLO*p*O(ULj RO2U (1*O2Qf
like with full disclosures, no coercion, etc. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009)
(state law duty of disclosure).
132. See Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 7.1 h“AL*P1)QP *PU,U O+ 21 +O2QLU +U* 1R
WPp,pW*U,O+*OW+ *Pp* 4p,M+ *PU LO4O*+ 1R *PU o1p,V:+ .1mU, *1 VUWOVU )2OLp*U,pLLjf UO*PU, pW,1++
jurisdictions or within them, there are general tendencies. Corporate law seldom limits board
discretion unless corporate actions or decisions share the following two characteristics: (1)
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mix of governance contracting133 and regulations.
Regulations would typically focus on either vertical side attempting to
WO,W)4(U2* *PU 1*PU,:+ R)2Vp4U2*pL ,OQP*+d ]2 *U,4+ 1R VUpL +*,)W*),O2Qf *PU
court is very much pro-board. Hence, under the Delaware free market
doctrine of independent legal significance, 134 p o1p,V W1)LV WP11+U p2 “p++U*
+pLU” 1(U, p “4U,QU,f” mPOWP potentially bypasses certain shareholder
rights.135 On more fundamental governance matters, however, Schnell136 and
Blasius137 clearly prohibit managers from amending bylaws
*PUj p,U Lp,QU ,ULp*O(U *1 *PU .p,*OWO.p2*+: +*pMU O2 *PU W14.p2j rp2V PU2WUf ] 1o+U,(U LOMULj
*1 W12+*O*)*U +14U VUQ,UU 1R “O2(U+*4U2*” *O2MU,O2Qf (U,+)+ +*,OW*Lj .),+)O2Q “+*,p*UQOW”
objectives], and (2) they create a possible conflict of interest for directors, even if this conflict
does not rise to the level of a self-VUpLO2Q *,p2+pW*O12d”gd Fundamental matters could include
issues like charter and certain bylaws amendments, director elections, certain fundamental
transaction deals (M&A) and dissolution. Beyond voting, certain fundamental deals could
*,OQQU, “+*p*)*1,j p..,pO+pL” ,OQP*+ R1, VO++U2*O2Q +Pp,UP1LVU,+ – or even fiduciary duties
“.L)+f” +)WP p+ ?U(L12 1, 7UO2oU,QU, VUpL “4pkO4Oip*O12” V)*OU+ 1mUV *1 .)oLOW
shareholders.
133. See Del Code. Ann. Tit. 8 § 109(a) (*j.OWpLLj “2U)*,pLLj” giving each vertical side
considerable “)2OLp*U,pL” ojLpm+ p4U2V4U2*+ .1mU,+ *1 Uk.p2V 12U +OVU:+ ,OQP*+ p2V LO4O*
*PU 1*PU,:+f +)oNUW* *1 *PU WPp,*U,g; Del Code. Ann. Tit. 8 § 109(a) (but the board cannot
“)2OLp*U,pLLj” )2V1 +Pp,UP1LVU, pV1.*UV ojLpm+g% Del Code. Ann. Tit. 8 § 141(a) (but extreme
shareholVU, pV1.*UV “)2OLp*U,pL” ojLpm+ 4OQP* .1*U2*OpLLj )2VU,4O2U *PU o1p,V:+ WU2*,pLOiUV
management powers); Del Code. Ann. Tit. 8 § 242(b) (charter amendments, however, require
“oOLp*U,pL” +)..1,*f 4pMO2Q p4U2V4U2*+ 1R “Q1(U,2p2WU” *U,4+ 41,U VORROW)L*g. But see
Marco Ventoruzzo, 4#!o$7r3ng 15.r75o/d7rs 3n (3r7"tors’ 4/7"t3ons: A Revolution in the
Making, 7 EUROPEAN COMP. FIN. L. REV. 105 (2010) (noting how historically management
had the contractual upper hand with provisions like plurality director voting, but today the
rise of institutional investor activism might make all this moot).
134. But see William J. Carney, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success, 2009
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 14 (observing how some see theorists see a “gradual erosion of the doctrine
of independent legal significance.ddd”).
135. See Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 74 (Del. Ch. 1963) (merger
shareholder rights bypassed in an asset reorganization, notwithstanding similar results). But
see Farris v. Glen Alden, 143 A.JV JG h@pd KDGEg h+14U +*p*U+ pV1.* p 41,U “.p*U,2pLO+*OW”
regulatory view on the matter, known as the de facto merger doctrine).
136. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439-440 (Del. 1971)
(describing how management amended the bylaws to move up the shareholders: annual
meeting to stop an insurgent shareholder proxy fight to replace the incumbent board, but the
court found that even legal bylaws amendments would be impermissible, in equity, since they
were anti-democratic); William J. Carney, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 13 (“After offering practitioners considerable clarity about
their clients: freedom of action under Delaware law, the Delaware Supreme Court:s equitable
interests (implied in Judge Leahy:s language in Langfelder), reasserted themselves in Schnell
v. Chris-Craft Industries.”).
137. See Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. 1988) (describing how
management amended the bylaws to increase the size of the board as a takeover defense
against an insurgent shareholder proxy fight seeking board control, which was impermissible
under Unocal scrutiny, since it was anti-democratic).
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antidemocratically.
Inversely, although shareholders have broad
fundamental governance powers, Hollinger138 prohibits a controlling
shareholder from amending the bylaws, if abusive.
b.

Regulations

One might first observe the philosophy of tULpmp,U:+ vertical
regulations. On the one hand, managers are 100% paid agents and without
property in the corporation apart from the rise of incentive schemes. Hence,
as pure agents, such managers at times might shirk, ultimately harming firm
value. 139 On the other hand, all managers have some form of corporate
centralized management position rights and functions, which call for
significant discretions, a reasonably necessary byproduct of large complex
corporations that ultimately facilitates firm value.
Hence, to deter reckless agents, Delaware law first calls for fiduciary
duty ideals. However, such duties can induce the opposite problem of overcautious and deterred agents. Hence, in quite a few cases, purely hortatory
duties are effectively eliminated by a dominant business judgment rule
presumption that frequently protects managers from corporate liabilities for
breaches of certain fiduciary duties. 140 “rYq1+* N),O+VOW*O12+ ,UW1Q2OiU p . . .
principle of corporate law, the business judgment rule, which effectively
insulates from legal challenge business decisions taken in good faith (that is,
mO*P1)* O2*U2* *1 Pp,4 *PU W14.p2jgd” 141 In short, this shielding principle is
(U,j 4)WP p “LU* O* oU” +1,* 1R 21*O12d
As a back-up, sometimes Delaware permits either indemnification142
ho)* 21* R1, “opV RpO*P”g143 1, O2+),p2WU .pj4U2*+ h). *1 .1LOWj “LO4O*+”g,144
138. See Hollinger International, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2004) (concluding
that it was impermissible when a controlling shareholder sought to amend the bylaws to stop
the board:s poison pill takeover defensive powers that tried to shut down the controller:s
allegedly abusive sale, in violation of the spirit of duties and contract).
139. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Conflict of
Interest Regulation, 82 IOWA L. REV. 965, 968 (“Every time one person (the agent) acts on
behalf of another person (the principal), the agent has an incentive to shirk or serve his own
interests, simply because the agent does not capture the full benefit of his labor.”).
140. Anatomy, supra note 15, § 3.6 (“All managerial and board decisions are constrained
by general fiduciary norms, such as the duties of loyalty and care.”). The natures of care and
loyalty duties are largely intuitive. One could imagine any boss wanting not only various
forms of diligence from his employees, but also service with full loyalty.
141. Id. at § 3.6.1.
142. See Del Code. Ann. Tit. 8 § 145(a) (2018).
143. See Waltuch v. Conticommodity Services, 88 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1996) (“additional”
indemnification powers do not encompass “bad faith”).
144. See Del Code. Ann. Tit. 8 § 145(g) (2018).
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URRUW*O(ULj W,Up*O2Q p +UW12Vp,j o)+O2U++ N)VQ4U2* ,)LU “LO*Uf” o)* +)oNUW*
212U*PULU++ *1 4)WP m1,+U ,U.)*p*O12pL “o,UpWP” O4.LOWp*O12+d
Beyond courts, I might additionally point out how, in the current
environment, *PU,U p,U pLmpj+ 4p,MU* “+).U,-,UQ)Lp*O12+” p* m1,Md `1,
example, from a stick perspective, inefficient or otherwise unpopular 145
managers might incur institutional shareholder wrath, via the “W11,VO2p*UV”
exercise of their property rights (like selling stock, voting out management
or ISS issuing negative ratings). Moreover, beyond ISS, the market for
corporate control always threatens to punish inefficient managers with an
O44O2U2* “P1+*OLU” *pMU1(U,d "Uj12V p2y form of stick, managers today can
R),*PU, oU “+).U,-,UQ)Lp*UV” *P,1)QP *PU ,O+U 1R Wp,,1* O2WU2*O(U
compensation schemes, 146 re-directing their incentives more in the direction
of shareholders. Thus, given all the above checks, a judicial decision to leave
the matter to the free markets still will subject the managers to significant
“VU RpW*1” ,UQ)Lp*O12+d Perhaps then the big question is what actual judicial
“regulations” p,U +*OLL “2UWU++p,j”?
1.

Duty of Care
I.

Gross Negligence

In the case of ordinary non-conflicted business decisions, the relevant
fiduciary duty checking bad management decisions is the duty of care.
`,pOVO2 1o+U,(U+ *Pp* “Wp,U” *j.OWpLLj O2(1L(U+ “O2R1,4p*O12pL p2V .),U
proWU++ RpW*1,+d”147
@POL1+1.POWpLLjf *PU OVUp 1R “Wp,U” O+ +O4.Lj *1 .,1V)WU p ,Up+12poLj
“VOLOQU2*” VUWO+O12f mPOWP +UU4+ p +*,pOQP*R1,mp,V VU+O,U R,14 *PU
.,O2WO.pL:+ .U,+.UW*O(Ud ")* LOMU pLL V)*OU+f “Wp,U” OVUpL+ QO(U ,O+U *1 p
conundrum. On the one handf mO*P1)* “Wp,U” OVUpL+f 4p2pQU,+ p+ +PO,MO2Q
pQU2*+ 4OQP* p* *O4U+ 4pMU (U,j O2p**U2*O(U VUWO+O12+ hPU2WU *pMO2Q “,UWMLU++
,O+M+”gf *P)+ Pp,4O2Q RO,4 “(pL)Ud” A2 *PU 1*PU, Pp2Vf *PU Lpm 4p2Vp*O2Q
*11 4)WP “Wp,U” m1)LV U2QU2VU, +U,O1)+ +1WOpL .,1oLU4+f QOven the fact that
4p2j “+*,p*UQOW” VUWO+O12+ p,U W14.LOWp*UV p2V POQPLj Uk p2*U
O2VU*U,4O2p*O12f ,U-)O,O2Q ,O+M+ 1R 4O+*pMU+d ^U2WUf *11 4)WP “Wp,U” W1)LV
145. ] Pp(U ,UpV p,*OWLU+ po1)* ]>> oUO2Q ).+U* po1)* “(pL)U” O++)U+ h.p,*OW)Lp,Lj +P1,**U,4gf +)WP p+ )2RpO, Q1(U,2p2WU .,pW*OWU+ h+pj 1(U,Lj +*,12Q *pMU1(U, “VURU2+U+”g p2V 21*
distributing sufficient dividends (especially in the absenWU 1R p *U,,OROW RO,4 “L12Q-*U,4” .Lp2g
– p2V “U*POW+” O++)U+f +)WP p+ .U,WUO(UV .11, !>? .,pW*OWU+d
146. See supra Section II.E.
147. Samuel N. Fraidin, Duty of Care Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Intuition and
Social Psychology Research, 38 U.C. D AVIS L. REV. 1, 22 (2004).
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lead to managerial risk aversion, 148 *P)+ pL+1 Pp,4O2Q RO,4 “(pL)Uf” O2 *PU oOQ
picture.
Drawing that fine line sounds like it could be quite difficult and elusive.
But in a hard-working land with market checks like the United States, one
m1)LV Uk.UW* *Pp*f R1, *PU 41+* .p,*f ,UQ)Lp*O12+ V1 21* Pp(U *1 .1LOWU “Wp,U”
so strictly, hence here the Delaware law typically invokes a strong business
N)VQ4U2* ,)LU “+POULVf” )2LU++ +14U*PO2Q O+ P1,,OoLj m,12Q O2 p (U,j
obvious way. 149
`,pOVO2 1o+U,(U+ *Pp* “Wp,U” *j.OWpLLj O2(1L(U+
“O2R1,4p*O12pL p2V .),U .,1WU++ RpW*1,+d”150
Hence, in normal non-conflicted decision-making, managers should
+O4.Lj oU “,Up+12poLj” O2R1,4UV po1)* *PU oU2URO*+ 1R *PUO, VUWO+O12+ 151 and
have back-up evidence therefor (even if ultimately mistaken). Not having
+)WP p 4O2O4pL op+OW “O2R1,4p*O12pL .,1WU++” m1)LV 1o(O1)+Lj Pp(U iU,1
“Wp,U )*OLO*OU+f” U(U2 *pMO2Q O2*1 pWW1)2* 4p2pQU4U2*:+ “+*,p*UQOW” ,1LUd
The first signal that the duty of care could be breached came in a
management discredited era in the Aronson v. Lewis case (1984), 152 which
suggested that only something as +U(U,U p+ “Q,1++ 2UQLOQU2WU” m1)LV ,Uo)*
the protective presumptions of the business judgment rule. 153 Since there are
.1mU,R)L *PU1,U*OWpL ,Up+12+ R1, *PU o)+O2U++ N)VQ4U2* ,)LU “+POULVf” *PU
W1),* mp+ LOMULj *PO2MO2Q *Pp* R1, +*,OW*Lj “Wp,U” .,1oLU4+f 12Lj +14U*PO2Q
terrible would break it.
Then, one year later, Van Gorkom154 held managers liable under
A,12+12 “Q,1++ 2UQLOQU2WU” .,O2WO.LU+d 155 After Van Gorkom, vertical
148. See Gagliardi v. TriFood Inten., Inc. 683 A.2d 1049, 1053 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(“Shareholders can diversify the risks of their corporate investments. Thus, it is in their
economic interest for the corporation to accept in rank order all positive net present value
investment projects available to the corporation, starting with the highest risk adjusted rate of
return first. Shareholders don:t want (or shouldn:t rationally want) directors to be risk
averse.”).
149. “Indeed, before Van Gorkom, Delaware directors had never been held liable for a
breach of the duty of care not also involving a breach of the duty of loyalty.” Robert T. Miller,
Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Kobayashi Maru: The Place of the Trans Union Case in the
Development of Delaware Corporate Law, 9 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 65, 129 (2017).
150. Samuel N. Fraidin, Duty of Care Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Intuition and
Social Psychology Research, 38 U.C. D AVIS L. REV. 1, 22 (2004).
151. See Paramount Commc:ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989)
(“[T]he question of <long-term: versus <short-term: values is largely irrelevant because
directors, generally, are obliged to chart a course for a corporation which is in its best interests
without regard to a fixed investment horizon.”)..
152. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
153. Id. at 812 (“[O]ur analysis satisfies us that under the business judgment rule director
liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”).
154. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
155. Id. at 880 (“The Court found those factors denoting competence to be outweighed by
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regulated entities were not sure whether all duty of care issues would be more
heavily scrutinized from then on, while others believed that Van Gorkom was
+*,OW*Lj p LO4O*UV “*pMU1(U, +pLU” Wp+Ud “=PU,U O+ p op+OW -)U+*O12 p+ *1
whether [Van Gorkomq O+ p V)*j 1R Wp,U Wp+U 1, p *pMU1(U, Wp+Ud”156
I observe that the facts of Van Gorkom O2(1L(UV p2 1o(O1)+ “*pMU1(U,
salU” *1 p 4p2pQU4U2* Rp(1,UV mPO*U M2OQP* oOVVU, mP1 PpV p ,U.)*p*O12 R1,
oUO2Q (U,j L1(poLU *1 V1 o)+O2U++ mO*Pd Y1,U1(U,f p.p,* R,14 4p2pQU4U2*:+
)2VU,+*p2VpoLU “L1(U” R1, O*+ “Rp(1,UVf” *PU o1p,V:+ VUpL pL+1 L11MUV -)O*U
good by several relevant metrics.
By stock metrics, the board had some informational process to back up
its sale decision, with both some form of front-end valuation study,
combined with a back-end market test. 157 Furthermore, the sale price
appeared to give the existing shareholders a very hefty 44.7% premium
above market price. By firm metrics, the corporation had tax problems that
prohibited the firm from utilizing its tax credits and this favored sale was
anticipated to unlock its slumbering value. 158
But the problem is that this deal, while good, was non-maximized, since
both the front-end and back-end had process problems or imperfections.
While the back-end process requirements are largely determined by the
subsequent Revlon doctrine jurisprudence, 159 Van Gorkom articulated frontend ideals that still stand today. Before recommending the deal,
4p2pQU4U2* +P1)LV Pp(U p “RO2pL” (pL)p*O12 +*)Vj *Pp* (pL)U+ *PU W14.p2j
in all sale contexts160 and with regard to all key assets. 161 Further, the board
should have enough of an advance notice, and a long enough actual meeting
time, to contemplate and reflect on that study, and then ask and discuss tough
questions about it.162
evidence of gross negligence . . . .”).
156. William T. Allen & Reinier Kraakman, Judicial Protection: The Business Judgment
Rule, in COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (TEACHER:S
MANUAL) (2016), § 6.4 [hereinafter Commentaries and Cases].
157. See id. at 878 (noting the defendants: reliance on the performance of a market test to
eliminate the need for the Board to perform any other fairness test). By a market test, I mean
some form of entertaining alternative bids to put the favored bid:s supposed superiority to the
test.
158. See id. at 864 (“[T]he Company had difficulty in generating sufficient taxable income
to offset increasingly large investment tax credits.”).
159. See infra Section IV at 55 (discussing the effects and triggers of the Revlon doctrine).
160. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 876 (observing how the board:s study failed to value
the firm in all contexts).
161. See id. (noting that the valuation study also did not consider key assets).
162. See id. at 875 (“Considering all of the surrounding circumstances T hastily calling
the meeting without prior notice of its subject matter, the proposed sale of the Company
without any prior consideration of the issue or necessity therefor, the urgent time constraints
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Unlike in classic strategic decision situations that are largely
O2VU*U,4O2p*U Uk p2*Uf *PU W1),* RUL* LOMU *PU “*pMU1(U, +pLU” process was
obvious, or strictly a matter of common sense, essentially being nothing
more than a reasonable front-end plus back-end process. In this special
context, under auction theory, the right process should always yield a
maximized deal result, hence in theory less process would have absolutely
zero utilities for the society. With management discredited in the 1980s, the
court made a trumpet call for a better process in obvious situations, thereby
hopefully curbing reckless managerial risk-taking, where it was reasonably
possible to do so. Hence, Van Gorkom “Wp,U” p* Lp+* P1O+*UV 1(U, *PU
o)+O2U++ N)VQ4U2* ,)LU “+POULV” p,Q)poLj ,U.,U+U2*UV p (U,j Uk*,U4U +U* 1R
facts.
II.

Charter Exculpations

But was management in Van Gorkom actually so terrible, if they
produced a quite good deal by both agency and firm metrics? While the
+O4.LU *,)*P 1R p2 p)W*O12 .,1WU++ O2 p “+pLU” O+ (U,j LOMULj N)+*OROpoLUf op+UV
12 W14412 +U2+Uf *PU W1),*:+ *,)4.U* WpLL R1, 41,U Wp,UR)L +W,)*O2j
nonetheless scared managers, who may have been thinking about a slippery
slope eventually leading to the court second-Q)U++O2Q “+*,p*UQOW” VUWO+O12+f
p2V 21* 12Lj “*pMU1(U, +pLU+d” ALL *PO+ W1)LV mULL Pp(U W,Up*UV *PU )2mp2*UV
problem of over-deterring management (and consequently Delaware charter
“Lpmf” QO(U2 *PU *P,Up* 1R Uk1V)+gd 163 The legislature thus quickly acted and
gave a Middle Way compromise solution, 164 by making the Van Gorkom
+*,OW*Lj “VO,UW*1,” V)*j 1R Wp,U LOpoOLO*j p “oOQ o1j” WPp,*U, Q1(U,2p2WU 4p**U,
with DGCL, §102(b)(7)165 charter exculpations. This provision permits, with
imposed by Pritzker, and the total absence of any documentation whatsoever T the directors
were duty bound to make reasonable inquiry of Van Gorkom and Romans, and if they had
done so, the inadequacy of that upon which they now claim to have relied would have been
apparent.”). But it is also worth noting that some theorists would argue that in a more
“exigent” emergency situation not of management:s own creation, then management should
be able to act with “less process” and still meet its “care” duties. Bill Carney once proposed
to me the problem of the board receiving a “whopper” bid with an “urgent” deadline, not of
the board:s own creation.
163. See Nees supra note 25, at 210 (“Van Gorkom triggered a backlash in corporate law
over the fear that it would chill the American entrepreneurial spirit within the boardroom.”).
164. See Matthew R. Berry, Does Delaware’s Section 102(b)(7) Protect Reckless
Directors from Personal Liability? Only if Delaware Courts Act in Good Faith, 79 WASH. L.
REV. 1125, 1137 (2004) (“After Van Gorkom, the Delaware legislature responded to directors:
fears of potential liability and shareholders: desire to retain quality, risk-taking directors by
enacting section 102(b)(7).”).
165. Del Code. Ann. Tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (providing that the charter can eliminate or limit
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“oOLp*U,pL” p..,1(pL ho1p,V p2V +Pp,UP1LVU,+gf oLp2MU* UkW)L.p*O12 1R pLL
(U,*OWpL +*,OW*Lj “Wp,U” V)*OU+ .,1oLU4+f 166 without the need for case-by-case
outsider ratification. 167 All this, oj W12*,pW*f URRUW*O(ULj U2Lp,QU+ *PU o1p,V:+
o)+O2U++ N)VQ4U2* ,)LU “+POULVd”
Today, the vast majority of public corporations take this charter
exculpation tactic,168 PU2WU “1.*O2Q 1)*” 1R Van Gorkom is far and away the
norm, notwithstanding its technical W12*O2)UV UkO+*U2WU p+ “VURp)L*” Lpmd All
this is probably for the best, since if there are equally strong arguments on
both sides, Middle Way makes sense. Further, with the rise of institutional
O2(U+*1,+f “W12*,pW*)pL” ,p*OROWp*O12 oUW14U+ 41,U p2V 41,e meaningful.
2.

Duty of Loyalty
I.

Entire Fairness

Disloyalty is the far more complicated (and potentially more intrusive)
of the two major Delaware fiduciary duties. One must first philosophically
assess what exactly is disloyalty. On the one hand, at some degree too much
self-O2*U,U+* WLUp,Lj O4.pO,+ O2+OVU, “1oNUW*O(O*j” p2V oUW14U+ pQU2Wj
“po)+O(Ud” ^U2WUf at least certain conflicts must be scrutinized with some
VUQ,UU 1R “,Up+12poLU +MU.*OWO+4d” On the other hand, corporate directors
are obviously not pure fiduciary machines. Some degree of self-interest is
omnipresent,169 natural and healthy170 for human beings. Hence, given the
opV p2V Q11V *1QU*PU,f *PU Lpm 4)+* 21* “1(U,-.1LOWU” W12RLOW*+f o)* O2+*UpV
“the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders. . . .”, subject to
certain carve-outs).
166. See Berry, supra note 164, at 1138 (“Delaware courts interpret section 102(b)(7) to
protect directors from personal liability arising from all duty of due care violations.”).
167. I observe that, in contrast to disloyalty problems, there is typically no need for
“outsider” ratification of straight care issues, since care is inherently an “insider” issue.
Insiders are best poised to assess their strategic calculations, absent taint.
168. See Bernard S. Sharfman, The Enduring Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 287, 289 (2008) (“Professor Hamermesh reported that out of a sample of one
hundred Fortune 500 companies, ninety-eight had adopted an exculpatory provision.”).
169. Life obviously involves “potentially” conflicting interests in nearly every situation.
Even a friend today could become a rival tomorrow. Or, in business, a lucratively salaried
CEO would obviously want the company to do well, but then could become too selfish when
negotiating for his or her own compensation.
170. I observe a few possible good outcomes for certain conflicted interest deals. Dealing
with arm:s length strangers (while very clean) involves a lot of uncertainty, so there are at
times advantages to insiders dealing with people that they know and trust (such as
themselves), with potentially lower negotiation and transaction costs. Also, if insiders can
extract some extra money out of the corporation, then perhaps they could also work for less
corporate money, achieving some form of “scale” cost reductions.
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simply re-right the ship.
A oO* p41,.P1)+f *PU W1),* Pp+ 21*UV *PU “WLp++OW +U2+U” 1R VO+L1jpL*jf
p+ “.,URU,,O2Q *PU pV(U,+U +ULR-interest of the fiduciary or of a related person
to the interest of the corporation. . . d” 171 I observe how vertical disloyalty
could then be viewed simply as a vertical freeze-1)*f 1, “1(U,-,UpWPO2Qf” OdUdf
*PU 4p2pQU,+ +UOiO2Q “*11 4)WPf” mO*P1)* p +)RROWOU2*Lj U(U2 U21)QP “-)OV
.,1 -)1f” *1 *PU UkWL)+O12 p2V VU*,O4U2* 1R *PU .)oLOW +Pp,UP1LVU,+d 172
When tracing out the Delaware law of disloyalty, the first step is to ask
OR *PU,U O+ p L1jpL*j V)*jf “*1 mP14” UkpW*Lj O+ *Pp* V)*j 1mUV# ]2 *PU Up,Lj
Vpj+f o1p,V+ PpV *1 oU Kbb3 1oUVOU2* *1 *PU “+P1,*-*U,4” O2*U,U+*+ 1R *PUO,
shareholders.173 Whereas in Delaware, today, boards have flexibility to
discharge their duties to help virtually any corporate constituency, if for the
1(U,pLL Q11V 1R *PU “RO,4f” 174 unless in Revlon mode, which only then would
require strictly the old Dodge “+P1,*-*U,4” +Pp,UP1LVU, 1oUVOU2WU.
Disloyalty also comes in a couple flavors, one milder and the other more
pungent. In Delaware, soft forms of managerial disloyalty are often not
viewed with great regulatory suspicions, like say parachutes 175 law176 or
even Unocal “*pMU1(U,” VURU2+U+ hVO+W)++UV oUL1mgd "1*P 1R *PU+Uf mPOLU
raising some modicum of obvious taint alarm, both can be very good things
p+ mULLf oj UO*PU, pLOQ2O2Q “*pMU1(U,” O2*U,U+*+ 1, ROQP*O2Q 1RR ,pOVU,
“*P,Up*+d”
The more interesting topic is hard disloyalty, i.e., situations where
insider conflicts more obviously flare up, which could broadly encompass a
multitude of potentially “po)+O(U” W12RLOW*UV areas, such as managerial
compensation, managers on both sides of a transaction, even other subtler
conflicts of interest (such as say in Cooke, where self-interested directors
allegedly sought to protect their interests as creditors rather than pursue

171. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006).
172. See infra note 303 and accompanying text (horizontal freeze-out standard).
173. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459 (Mich. 1919) (no flexibility to use
corporate funds to pursue “long-term” purposes).
174. See Unocal v. Mesa, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (flexibility for boards to pursue “longterm” interests, if “rationally related” to shareholder value).
175. See Henry F. Johnson, Those “Golden Parachute” Agreements: The Taxman Cuts
the Ripcord, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 46-48 (1985) (noting the increase in parachutes, which
insure against job loss, as a compensation mechanism for managers involved in hostile
takeovers).
176. For example, the Sixth Circuit Campbell court, applying Delaware law, held that
parachutes would receive summary judgment for the defendants on the business judgment
rule issue. See Campbell v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, Inc., 238 F.3d 792, 800 (2001)
(“In short, evaluating the costs and benefits of golden parachutes is quintessentially a job for
corporate boards, and not for federal courts.”).
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superior shareholder value),177 or the highly amorphous corporate
opportunity doctrine. 178 All of these situations raise sharper alarm that the
firm might be hurt by the O2+OVU,:+ +ULR-interest. Hence, the Delaware law
machinery then comes into greater play.
The first major mention of Delaware vertical disloyalty liability came
in the management discredited post-Depression era (1939) in Guth v. Loft,179
which held that hard enough vertical disloyalty would result in a
“W12+*,)W*O(U *,)+*” O44UVOp*ULj VO+Q1,QO2Q pLL .,1RO*+d 180 This meant that
O4.U,4O++OoLU (U,*OWpL VO+L1jpL*j mp+ Kbb3 (1OVf mO*P1)* R),*PU, “RpO,2U++”
scrutiny. Philosophically, that meant that the law asked agents to be perfect
fiduciary machines, which was obviously unfair for managers, if what they
VOV mp+ )L*O4p*ULj “RpO,” p2V Q11V R1, *PU W1,.1,p*O12d ^U2WU, in the
subsequent more prosperous American post-war years restoring
management credibility, Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp.181 shifted the
100% void disloyalty rule to the vertical freeze-out +*p2Vp,V+ 1R “O2PU,U2*
RpO,2U++f” 4Up2O2Q *Pp* *PU O2+OVU, W1)LV .1*U2*OpLLj .,1(U *Pp* p2j *pO2*UV
VUpL mp+ )L*O4p*ULj “RpO,f”182 especially after full disclosures.183 The
177. Cooke v. Oolie, 2000 WL 710199 at *1 (Del. Ch. 2000).
178. Sometimes insider fiduciaries seek to pursue “personal” opportunities, which to the
fiduciaries are “outside” their fiduciary capacities, but which to the corporation should
arguably nonetheless “belong to” the corporation. The argument that directors are not
fiduciary machines has even stronger potency when their “personal” lives implicate matters
that seem arguably “outside” the corporation, and hence “reasonably necessary” parts of
existence, just like say care “discretion.” But some might fear too many insider “abuses.”
Different societies use a number of “test-paradigm” variations, which could look at both “the
means” and “ends” of the disputed “opportunities,” all attempting to draw the ambiguous line
between what “opportunities” are fundamentally “inside” versus “outside.” Just like the “testparadigm,” the “factual” resolutions under any adopted test could be equally ambiguous,
following this riddle.
179. Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255 (Del. Ch. 1939).
180. See id. at 270 (“Given the relation between the parties, a certain result follows; and a
constructive trust is the remedial device through which precedence of self is compelled to
give way to the stern demands of loyalty.”).
181. 33 Del. Ch. 82 (Del. Ch. 1952).
182. See id. (“In such a situation the burden is upon the directors to prove not only that the
transaction was in good faith, but also that its intrinsic fairness will withstand the most
searching and objective analysis.”).
183. In the old days, lack of disclosures rendered a “conflicted” as 100% “void,” probably
recognizing the paramount importance of keeping shareholders alerted about possible
“abuses.” Such an approach might have derived from partnership law:s fine “fiduciary” duties
under Meinhard v. Salmon. Today, lack of “disclosures” might simply play into Weinberger
“entire fairness”, probably recognizing that a “fair deal” results in no prejudice to the
shareholders. However, even in the current day, absolute horrors like “fraud” are at times
treated as 100% void, although Weinberger suggested possible “equitable remedies” instead.
The line between “conflicts” and “fraud” is perhaps not always so clear, but presumably
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Weinberger case184 pVVUV *Pp* p2j “U2*O,U RpO,2U++” +W,)*O2j m1)LV O2(1L(U
*m1 p+.UW*+f “RpO, VUpLO2Q” .L)+ “RpO, .,OWUd” 185
II.

Takeover Jurisprudence

The centerpiece issue in vertical takeover decisions is that of takeover
defenses. It is worth first defining what one means by defenses. Scholars
Pp(U *pLMUV po1)* 4p2pQU,+: .1mU,+ *1 “N)+* +pj 21” *1 P1+*OLU oOVVU,+,186
+O2WU p2 URRUW*O(U “VURU2+U” pL41+* Q)p,p2*UU+ *Pp* “1)*+OVU,” oOVVU,+ mOLL
be unwilling to purchase shares directly from shareholders, unless and until
redeemed. ] pVV *Pp* O* W1)LV pL+1 oU VURO2UV p+ 4p2pQU,+: .1mU,+ iUpL1)+Lj
to pursue their favored and disfavor their unwanted alternatives, which I refer
*1 p+ *PUO, “L1(U p2V Pp*U” .1mU,+d
As noted, while takeovers are good and bad,187 +1 p,U 4p2pQU4U2*:+
defenses. While defenses can protect the corporation, perhaps because
4p2pQU,+ *PO2M 41,U “L12Q-*U,4” *Pp2 “W12R)+UV” +Pp,UP1LVU,+f 188 managers
can also act self-interestedly out of entrenchment desires, fearing being fired
by a hostile bidder, 189 and defenses in some cases can even eradicate
+OQ2OROWp2* .1,*O12+ 1R *PU +Pp,UP1LVU,+: “O2(U+*4U2*d” 190
Hence, Delaware law has evolved to be very complex minded on the
question of defensive disloyalty. The takeover disloyalty analysis is
essentially split between two distinct doctrines, which Kraakman refers to as
two different acts, 191 with first Unocal192 on the one hand, versus the later
“fraud” would encompass both clearer lying and stealing as well as a “scienter” level of
culpability.
184. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
185. I add that the subsequent Trados case clarified that “unfair dealing” alone would not
flunk “fairness” review, to the extent it didn:t infect “price.” See In re Trados Inc. Shareholder
Litigation, 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“Under the circumstances of this case, the fact that
the directors did not follow a fair process does not constitute a separate breach of duty. As
the Delaware Supreme Court has recognized, an unfair process can infect the price, result in
a finding of breach, and warrant a potential remedy.”).
186. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CH. L. REV. 871, 872 (2002) (asking
whether poison pill legality meant that “managers could <just say no.:”).
187. See supra Section II.
188. See infra Section IV.
189. Shane M. Shelley, Entrenched Managers & Corporate Social Responsibility, 111
PENN ST. L. REV. 107, 113 (2006) (“For example, Professors Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell
argue . . . two takeover defenses particularly entrench managers from shareholder and
takeover accountability and, in the end, are strongly associated with lower financial value.”).
190. See infra Section IV.
191. See Commentaries and Cases, supra note 156, § 12.1.
192. See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985) (discussing “non-
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Revlon193 on the other. As will be shown, the Unocal typically pro-board
defensive powers are balanced out with the Revlon pro-shareholder
auctioneering duties. Like day and night, Unocal and Revlon modes can
never be invoked at the exact same moment (one always withdraws from the
other),194 though I observe some twilight, with cases such as Time, Ivanhoe,
Restaurant Associates and even Omnicare,195 all of which are viewed by the
court as Unocal rather than Revlon cases.
i.

Unocal (Act I)

Leading up to Unocal, in the post-war management credibility era of
*PU KDFb+f *PU o1p,V PpV mOVU “)2OLp*U,pL” *pMU1(U, VURU2+O(U .1mU,+f )2VU,
Cheff.196 “rtqO,UW*1,+ +p*O+Rj *PUO, rVURU2+O(Uq o),VU2 oj +P1mO2Q Q11V RpO*P
and reasonable investigation; the directors will not be penalized for an honest
mistake of judgment . . . d”197
But in the complex 1980s years, the Unocal court needed to rethink its
takeover defense jurisprudence. After embracing Cheff as its first prong,
Unocal adopted the novel intrusive-sounding proportionality standard for
U(pL)p*O2Q *PU o1p,V:+ *pMU1(U, VURU2+U+f 4Up2O2Q *Pp* p2j “)2OLp*U,pL”
VURU2+U+ 4)+* oU “,Up+12poLU O2 ,ULp*O12 *1 *PU *P,Up* .1+UVd” 198 That
standard is known as a form of intermediate scrutiny, somewhere between
the business judgment rule and entire fairness in terms of court
intrusiveness.199 I might observe that the vertical conflicts duties are perhaps
takeover sale” defenses).
193. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986)
(discussing “takeover sale” defenses).
194. Plato, Phaedo, in PLATO: COLLECTED DIALOGUES 84, 84 (Edith Hamilton ed. 1999)
(“It seems to me not only that the form of tallness itself absolutely declines to be short as well
as tall, but also that the tallness which is us never admits smallness and declines to be
surpassed.”).
195. See infra Section IV at 66.
196. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 508 (Del. 1964) (holding that “if the actions were
proper because of a decision by the board made in good faith that the corporate interest was
served thereby, they are not rendered improper by the fact that some individual directors were
willing to advance personal funds if the corporation did not.”).
197. Id. at 506.
198. See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (“If a defensive
measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in
relation to the threat posed.”). As a subsequent case makes clear, “bilateral” charter
amendments “defenses” typically aren:t subject to Unocal – but could conceivably violate
“public policy” limits. See, e.g., Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).
199. See Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L. Wachter, Corporate Policy and the
Coherence of Delaware Takeover Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 523, 529 n.19 (“In Unocal, the
court favored intermediate scrutiny.”).
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reduced here, since Unocal is not a pure vertical axis issue, but additionally
O4.LOWp*U+ “Uk*U,2pL” pkO+ -)U+*O12+ mO*P arguably “1)*+OVU,” ,piders.
Today, the starting point of the Unocal analysis is dealing with a
W1,.1,p*U “*P,Up*f” mPOWP Pp+ o1*P p -)pLO*p*O(U p2V -)p2*O*p*O(U
dimension.200
Qualitatively, Unocal mentioned a laundry list of such threats:
Examples of such concerns may include: inadequacy of the price
offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the
O4.pW* 12 <W12+*O*)U2WOU+: 1*PU, *Pp2 +Pp,UP1LVU,+ hOdUdf W,UVO*1,+f
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community
generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of
securities being offered in the exchange. 201
However, quantitatively speaking, a Unocal “*P,Up*” .1*U2*OpLLj
justifying proportional defenses is not a none-or-all thing, but a question of
degree. Merely mild threats will justify fewer defensive powers. 202
In any event, the actual Unocal Wp+U “*P,Up* p2pLj+O+” mp+ 41+*Lj
worried about short-term value inadequacy, with the hostile bidder seeking
to do some form of low-ball “1)*,OQP*” coercive two-tier bid.203 The later
Time204 case confirmed that a Unocal O2pVU-)p*U oOV “*P,Up*” W1)LV pL+1
O2WL)VU p *P,Up* *1 *PU W1,.1,p*O12:+ L12Q-term value, even if the hostile bid
was at an apparently whopper price by short-term value metrics.205 Further,
the Time W1),* U(U2 PULV *Pp* .,1*UW*O2Q p “(pL)U” W1,.1,p*U “W)L*),U” 206

200. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (finding that a defensive measure “must be reasonable
in relation to the threat posed”).
201. Id.
202. Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000) (finding a mild Unocal
inadequate bid threat, and consequently less managerial defensive justifications); see, e.g.,
Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1389 (Del. 1995) (“[A]s a defensive
response . . . it was limited and corresponded in degree or magnitude to the degree or
magnitude of the threat, (i.e., assuming the threat was relatively <mild,: was the response
relatively <mild?:)”).
203. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956 (“Specifically, the Unocal directors had concluded that
the value of Unocal was substantially above the $54 per share offered in cash at the front end.
Furthermore, they determined that the subordinated securities to be exchanged in Mesa:s
announced squeeze out of the remaining shareholders in the <back-end: merger were <junk
bonds: worth far less than $54.”).
204. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
205. See id. at 1147 (“On June 7, 1989, these wishful assumptions were shattered by
Paramount:s surprising announcement of its all-cash offer to purchase all outstanding shares
of Time for $175 per share. The following day, June 8, the trading price of Time:s stock rose
from $126 to $170 per share.”).
206. Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1152 (noting that the board protected its perceived journalistic
integrity “culture”).
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could be a Unocal threat.207
Kraakman calls these novel Time long-term Unocal “*P,Up*+” p+
“+)o+*p2*O(U W1U,WO12f” 208 p +)o*LU, R1,4 1R W1U,WO12 *Pp2 “1)*,OQP*” two-tier
bids, essentially meaning that confused shareholders with short-term bias209
will ignorantly pick short-term over the superior long-term benefits of
4p2pQU4U2*:+ Rp(1,UV +*,p*UQOW .Lp2d 210
While the Delaware courts likely had the right idea with a Unocal
intermediate scrutiny standard, given the good and bad of takeovers and all
involved, the details were not fully worked out. Unocal resulted in
upholding an anti-democratic takeover defense that coerced the
W1,.1,p*O12:+ 1m2 +Pp,UP1LVU,+d "j +*1WM 4Utrics, shareholders, who
,UR)+UV *1 *U2VU, O2*1 *PU o1p,V:+ ,U.),WPp+U VURU2+Uf m1)LV LOMULj oU
diluted, given the whopper repurchase price and the probability of the
alternative defeated hostile bid falling through. Moreover, shareholders who
did tender U2VUV ). mO*P “5KdK oOLLO12 LU++ *Pp2 +Pp,UP1LVU,+ m1)LV Pp(U
received had [the hostile bid] been successful. . . d”211 Further, by firm
4U*,OW+f *PU o1p,V:+ ,U.),WPp+U VURU2+O(U 4Up+),U+ mU,U p R1,4 1R +W1,WPUV
earth, paying out to the tendering shareholders too much capital, which later
left the corporation itself in dire straits. 212
>1WO1L1QOWpLLj +.UpMO2Qf O2 *PO+ W14.LUk “*pMU1(U,” U,pf .U,Pp.+ *PU
court was under too much pressure to deal with the rampant Hollywood
207. But see eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(finding that providing free on-line classified advertisements to the community was not
evidence that corporation possessed “a palpable, distinctive, and advantageous culture that
sufficiently promoted stockholder value . . . .”).
208. I view this as the mother of all Unocal “threats.” However, in a PLI conference, I
heard it said that Vice Chancellor Laster was contemplating backtracking on the existence of
the “substantive coercion” threat, as shareholders become more institutional, who perhaps
should not be as confused, if fully informed? The answer to this debate possibly depends on
whether institutional shareholder musculature helps them understand long-term value, or
whether it is strictly a short-term value deal competence virtue.
209. See Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious
Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2092 (2010) (“Another set of
theorists . . . base their analyses not on a model of corporate structure, but rather on concerns
about the influence of short-term interests. In their view, shareholders have developed an
extremely short time horizon by which they judge the success of the corporation and its
leadership. As boards and officers have come under more pressure to follow the desires of
shareholders, they have adopted the goal of short-term share price maximization. This focus,
they argue, has skewed the perspectives of shareholders and, as a result, has hurt the longterm efficiency of corporations.”).
210. See Commentaries and Cases, supra note 156, § 12.2 (“The idea that shareholders
might tender out of ignorance or mistaken belief about the value of their stock.”).
211. Carney, supra note 46, at 329.
212. See id. (“Unocal paid out 59% of its pre-takeover bid equity to shareholders in this
restructuring.”).
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.,1oLU4+ p2V .,1*UW* *PU “O2VU.U2VU2*” bedrock of Delaware corporate
VU41W,pWjd ]2 p2j U(U2*f pR*U, 21* -)O*U RO2VO2Q O*+ “opLp2WUV” R11*O2Qf *PU
court then had to set off on an adventure to find the right Unocal pro+Pp,UP1LVU, “LO4O*+” 12 o1p,V .1mU,+d
The subsequent Time case shows that today, courts still have great
tolerance for a poorly decided takeover defense decision, which can be
WPpLMUV ). *1 4p2pQU,OpL “+*,p*UQOW” .1mU,+d 213 For the court, antidemocracy was and always is a bigger problem than poor decisions. As will
be shown, Delaware courts now have minimal tolerance for shareholder
proxy fight interference, zero tolerance for coercion, and perhaps a bit more
latitude for preclusion.
A few subsequent shareholder democracy cases are worth mentioning.
First, Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.214 held that management could
no longer take Unocal “,UpW*O(U” VURU2+O(U 4Up+),U+f 12WU p2 O2+),QU2*
shareholder signaled any form of proxy fight or consent solicitation on the
P1,Oi12f p* LUp+* 21* mO*P1)* 4UU*O2Q *PU PUp(j o),VU2 1R p “W14.elling
N)+*OROWp*O12d” 215
Interestingly enough, management in Blasius was
protecting what appeared to be a very intelligent plan in the face of a poorly
VUWOVUV O2+),QU2* .Lp2 *Pp* mp+ *11 POQPLj LU(U,pQUVf o)* *PU “W14.ULLO2Q
N)+*OROWp*O12” -)U+*O12 O+ 2U(er smart or poorly decided, but democratic or
undemocratic.216 As Blasius +*p*U+f “The theory of our corporation law
213. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1147-1148 (Del.
1989) (describing the circumstances under which the board turned down a “whopper” hostile
bid for its own long-term strategic plan that created desperate indebtedness for the
corporation).
214. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. 1988).
215. See id. at 661 (holding that the board must demonstrate a compelling justification for
acts that impede the exercise of shareholder voting power). Some later Blasius-line cases
point out that, in such situations, management is not even permitted to weaken the insurgent,
short of 100% foreclosing the insurgent. See, e.g., MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio,
Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003) (holding that management could not even partially “dilute”
the influence of insurgent directors). Further, apart from Blasius, the Delaware court is likely
to interpret the ambiguities of any proxy fight interfering bylaws provisions against the
drafter. See, e.g., Jana Master Fund, LTD v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335 (Del. Ch.
2008) (holding that CNET:s advance notice bylaw applied only to shareholder proposals that
are sought to be included in the company:s proxy materials pursuant to Rule 14a-8 under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and therefore did not apply to
independently financed shareholder proxy solicitations); Levitt Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc.,
2008 WL 1724244 (Del. Ch. 2008); DiEleuterio v. Cavaliers of Del., Inc., 1997 WL 6338
(Del. Ch. 1987).
216. I might note that in the Time case, the opposite happened, where management made
a poorly decided decision, which was both informed and democratic, and thus upheld. See
Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 1989 WL 79880 at *750 (Del. Ch. 1989) (“In the
decision they have reached here, the Time board may be proven in time to have been
brilliantly prescient or dismayingly wrong. . . . That many, presumably most, shareholders
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confers power upon directors as the agents of the shareholders; it does not
W,Up*U @Lp*12OW 4p+*U,+d”217 Hence, when stressed so heavily in an active
democratic proxy fight, the managerial corporate immune system must
somewhat relax itself (interestingly the opposite functionality here of a
P)4p2:+ O44)2U +j+*U4gd
Second, Unitrin218 held that under no circumstances could Unocal
VURU2+O(U 4Up+),U+ U(U, oUW14U mPp* *PU W1),* WpLLUV “W1U,WO(U” 1,
“.,UWL)+O(Ud” 219 “!1U,WO(U” mp+ 21* VURO2UV oj *PU W1),*f o)* ] ,UpV O* p+
management making the shareholders some form of offer that they cannot
refuse, like in the actual Unocal case. Unlike in Unocal, the repurchase in
Unitrin was a free-will offer,220 since it was non-diluting at market prices as
well as non-discriminatory. Hence, were Unitrin shareholders to have
,UR)+UV *PU o1p,V:+ ,U.),WPp+Uf *PUj m1)LV 21 L12QU, oU .)2O+PUV mO*P (pL)e
dilution like in the actual Unocal case.
For Unitrin “.,UWL)+O12f” *PU MUj -)U+*O12 O+ mPU*PU, *PU P1+*OLU oOV
“m1)LV UO*PU, oU 4p*PU4p*OWpLLj O4.1++OoLU 1, ,UpLO+*OWpLLj )2p**pO2poLUf” 221
a heavy burden for a plaintiff. The assessment of mathematical possibility
or impossibility is a complex inquiry, largely essentially determined by any
number of empirical considerations relevant thereto, like takeover defensive
trigger percentages (limiting ownership needed to run a successful proxy
fight),222 majority versus plurality voting, the presence of a lot of institutional
shareholders (known to oppose management), 223 p2V U(U2 *PU o1p,V:+
would prefer the board to do otherwise than it has done does not. . . afford a basis to interfere
with the effectuation of the board:s business judgment.”).
217. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663.
218. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1389 (Del. 1995).
219. See id. at 1387-88 (“If a defensive measure is not draconian, however, because it is
not either coercive or preclusive, the Unocal proportionality test requires the focus of
enhanced judicial scrutiny to shift to <the range of reasonableness.:”).
220. See id. at 1388 (“Here, there is no showing on this record that the Repurchase
Program was coercive.”).
221. Id. at 1389. The dead hand pill cases also teach that poison pill defenses should not
disable the power of future boards to redeem pills, in whole or in part, which obviously would
obviously interfere with any insurgent shareholder proxy fights. See, e.g., Carmody v. Toll
Brothers, Inc., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998) (prohibiting dead hand pills); Quickturn Design
Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998) (prohibiting even more moderated “slow
hand” pills).
222. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1382 (“If American General were to initiate a proxy contest
before acquiring 15% of Unitrin:s stock, it would need to amass only 45.1% of the votes
assuming a 90% voter turnout.”).
223. See id. at 1383 (“The record reflects that institutional investors held 42% of Unitrin:s
stock and 20 institutions held 33% of the stock. Thus, American General:s own assumptions
and calculations in the record support the Unitrin Board:s argument that <it is hard to imagine
a company more readily susceptible to a proxy contest concerning a pure issue of dollars.:”).
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significant ownership of stock (aligning interests). 224 It is possible that, in
WU,*pO2 +.UWOpL Wp+U+f OR *PU o1p,V:+ “VURU2+U+” Vo keep the firm
“O2VU.U2VU2*” hp2V VU41W,p*OWgf *PU2 *PU W1),* 4OQP* Pp(U p POQPU,
“.,UWL)+O12” *1LU,p2WUd 225
One last Unocal question is that of multiple cumulative defenses,
meaning management stacking multiple defensive measures, one on top of
the other. Unitrin held that multiple cumulative defenses could potentially
be viewed as Unocal proportional. 226 However, the later Chesapeake case
suggests that, at least at times, multiple cumulative defenses might make the
Unocal “*P,Up*” 4OLVU,f O2 *),2 N)+*ORjO2Q fewer board defensive measures. 227
Notice how as Unocal expanded vertical fiduciary duties, the pro-board
subsequent developments of the doctrine effectively also proportionately
Uk.p2VUV *PU o1p,V:+ o)+O2U++ N)VQU4U2* ,)LU “+POULVd”
ii.

Revlon (Act II)

Shortly after Unocal, the Revlon228 case came down, which potentially
intensified the pro-shareholder duty of loyalty, 229 in the event of an
p41,.P1)+ *,OQQU, 1R p “o,UpM-).d”230 Below, I discuss the two key aspects
of the Revlon doctrine, first effects and then triggers.
Revlon Effects
Should Revlon oU *,OQQU,UVf “r*qPU VO,UW*1,+: ,1LU WPp2QUr+q R,14
defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the
224. See id. (“Harold Hook, the Chairman of American General, admitted in his deposition
that the repurchase program is not a <show stopper: because the directors that own stock will
act in their own best interest if the price is high enough.”).
225. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Min. Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) (a 49.7%
white knight “defense” that kept the firm “independent.” subject to a strong enough standstill
agreement, did not breach Unocal, even though any future “takeover” would be improbable).
226. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d. at 1389 (“The Court of Chancery:s holding in Shamrock, cited
with approval by this Court in Time, appears to be persuasive support for the proportionality
of the multiple defenses Unitrin:s Board adopted.”).
227. See Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 343 (Del Ch. 2000) (“The more
important proportionality problem is the fact that the Supermajority Bylaw is an extremely
aggressive and overreaching response to a very mild threat. The board already had a poison
pill in place that gave it breathing room and precluded the Tender Offer.”).
228. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 173 (Del.
1986).
229. See id. at 182 (“The noteholders required no further protection, and when the Revlon
board entered into an auction-ending lock-up agreement with Forstmann on the basis of
impermissible considerations at the expense of the shareholders, the directors breached their
primary duty of loyalty.”).
230. See id. (“However, when Pantry Pride increased its offer to $50 per share, and then
to $53, it became apparent to all that the break-up of the company was inevitable.”).
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oU+* .,OWU R1, *PU +*1WMP1LVU,+ p* p +pLU 1R *PU W14.p2jd” 231 Hence, in Revlon
mode, just like a common sense regular auction, a manager loses all forms
of its Unocal “L1(U p2V Pp*U” VURU2+O(U .1mU,+ O2 Rp(1, 1R W1+4OW
“VU*pWP4U2*d”
"Uj12V “.,OWU” pL12Uf Dollar232 adds that Revlon can procure virtually
any form of reasonable short-term shareholder value. Presumably, that could
include deal terms,233 deal certainty, 234 perhaps also deal quickness, 235 but
probably not more long-term things like deal synergies or strategies. 236
"Uj12V *PU pR1,U4U2*O12UVf p2j (p,OU*OU+ 1R “oU2URO*+” *Pp* p “RO2pL”
shareholder can immediately realize should likely be viewed as Revlon
“+P1,*-*U,4 (pL)U” hLOMU +pj .U,Pp.+ “VUpL” *pk-advantaged structures).
The key to Revlon maximization evidence is a reasonably fair process.
Barkan237 and later Lyondell238 teach that maximization evidence will ideally
require some form of both reasonable front-end and back-end process. The
centerpiece of that Revlon process lies in the back-end jurisprudence of
defen+O(U “L1WM-).+” h1, Rp(1,O*O+4gd
In Revlonf *PU +*1,j oUQp2 mO*P p “P1+*OLU” oOVVU, mP1 Wp4U 1)* LOMULj
“L1m opLLO2Qf” PU2WU .,1opoLj *,OQQU,O2Q 4p2pQU4U2*:+ VO+LOMUf mPOWP *1
management seemed obviously justifiable, the twin situation of
4p2pQU4U2*:+ Rp(1ritism for its likeable white knight in Van Gorkom.
231. Id. at 182.
232. See Dollar, 13 A.3d at 595-96 (“[A]lthough the level of judicial scrutiny under Revlon
is more exacting than the deferential rationality standard applicable to run-of-the-mill
decisions governed by the business judgment rule, at bottom Revlon is a test of
reasonableness; directors are generally free to select the path to value maximization, so long
as they choose a reasonable route to get there.”).
233. See id. at 576 (“Dollar Thrifty shut down talks in order to extract better terms. . . d”).
234. See id. at 616 (“As things now stand, what is standing between the stockholders and
a deal with Avis is the Board:s determination that it will not consider Avis to have made a
superior proposal unless it provides a greater promise of closing certainty.”). In Dollar, the
board:s favored deal was superior in terms of deal certainty from an antitrust and financing
perspective. The favored deal also would give the company a reverse termination fee, as
compensation if the deal fell through.
235. Bill Carney once pointed out to me how a corporation once had two interested
bidders, one who was still preoccupied with another acquisition and a second who was
haggling over executing a confidentiality agreement. Both slow bidders were reasonably
excluded, for fear of a protracted process losing the first bidder, thus ultimately harming the
process. One possibility here would be to ask fair a “fair opportunity” final bid to speed up
all bidders, without any unreasonable exclusions.
236. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 34 (rejecting long-term value pursuits in Revlon mode).
237. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989).
238. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) (“[D]irectors must
<engage actively in the sale process,: and they must confirm that they have obtained the best
available price either by conducting an auction, by conducting a market check, or by
demonstrating <an impeccable knowledge of the market.:”).
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^U2WUf 4p2pQU4U2* pV1.*UV 4)WP “UkWU++O(U” Rp(1,O*O+4 *1 ROQP* 1RR p2
“)2mp2*UV” oOVVU, pL*U,2p*O(Ud
In the Revlon mode sale context, in contrast to Unocal, the court views
p2j R1,4 1R VURU2+O(U “UkWU++O(U” W12*,pW*)pLf239 economics240 or
governance241 defensive lock-ups242 as disloyal favoritism, interfering with
the reasonable openness of the back-U2V .,1WU++f mPOLU +*,OW*Lj “41VU,p*U”
favoritism is consistent with such process. I observe that when favoritism is
MU.* 12Lj “41VU,p*Uf” *PU 2p*),pL R1,WU+ 1R *PU R,UU 4p,MU*+ +P1)LV o,O2Q p
reasonable number of interested bidders into the auction process, thus by
necessity, under auction theory, a reasonably fair process should exist.
Kraakman points out how the Revlon .,1POoO*O12 1R “UkWU++O(U”
favoritism was criticized as too pro-shareholder. The famous pro-board
lawyer Martin Lipton observed how Revlon:+ .,1POoO*O12 *PU,U1R m1)LV
potentially shut down the auction process, by keeping away subsequent
bidders (fearO2Q oUO2Q p “+*pLMO2Q P1,+U”gd243 ^1mU(U,f ZO.*12:+ ,O(pL .,1shareholder lawyer, Joseph Flom, took the opposite view and saw Revlon as
the right precedent, believing that keeping some reasonable process open to
the bitter end would maintain the reasonable openness of the auction
process,244 ultimately maximizing shareholder short-term value.
239. Contractual lock-ups could include either no-shop or no-talk clauses. No-shop
clauses prohibit active solicitation of subsequent other bidders, while more extreme no-talk
clauses permit talking to them, even on an unsolicited basis.
240. Economics lock-ups could include lock-up options on shares or crown-jewel assets
like in the Van Gorkom and Revlon cases. More moderated economics lock-ups would
include reasonable termination fees. Any subsequent other bidder who acquires the company
will have to pay out the company:s economics lock-ups, thus deterring that bidder.
241. Governance lock-ups could include nixing a board:s fiduciary out to pull a deal for a
subsequent other bidder, or even shareholder voting commitments that cannot be pulled, all
like in the Omnicare case.
242. While lock-ups have these three flavors, the idea of any favoritism lock-up given to
a favored white knight better is simply to deter subsequent other bidders, thus making the first
deal consummation more probable.
243. Commentaries and Cases, supra note 156, at § 12.4 (“This is exactly the applepicking problem that we:ve been talking about: Forstmann finds an apple, and then he:s got
to compete with Perelman for the right to pick the apple. Well what kind of incentive is that
to find the apple in the first place?”). Hence, Lipton observedB “The ability to bring somebody
into a situation is far more important than the extra dollar a share at the back end. In other
words, at the front end you:re probably talking about 50%. At the back end you:re talking
about one or two percent. By saying that you have to be open to the last dollar at the back
end, maybe you:d better not start on the front end. And to me that:s the key to all of this.
That:s what I argued in Revlon. Remember, though, I lost Revlon, so I:m prejudiced.”
Interview with Martin Lipton, Senior Partner, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, in New York,
NY (June 14, 2000).
244. Interview with Joseph H. Flom, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, in New
York, NY (June 15, 2000), transcript at 4 (“The way I look at it is very simple. If you:re
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] 1o+U,(U *Pp* OR *PU,U O+ “UkWU++O(U” Rp(1,O*O+4f `L14 O+ W1,,UW* *Pp* *PU
back-end process would be too closed. For example, bringing the favored
white knight into the hokey back-end process in Revlon did not instantly
bring a whopper improvement of 50% as Lipton asserted, but only 5-6%.245
^1mU(U,f ZO.*12:+ “+*pLMO2Q P1,+U” W12WU,2+ +*OLL pL+1 ,O2Q *,)U *1 p WU,*pO2
but merely limited extent.
The truth is somewhere in between and hence the Revlon solution of
Middle Way favoritism, avoiding the problems of either extreme. Moderate
favoritism would obviously help create the auction, but then not close down
that process, if the favoritism is not so severe as to exclude subsequent other
interested bidders. The line dividing under T from excessive T is purely
an empirical matter.
]2 +P1,*f p2j R1,4 1R “41VU,p*U” Rp(1,O*O+4 *Pp* p ,Up+12poLU p)W*O12UU,
would adopt based on common sense would likely be upheld. As I show
below, however, only very slight favoritism would be embraced by
reasonable auctioneers, hence the Delaware Middle Way view on favoritism
significantly leans toward the Flom view. One possible short-hand maxim
is that the back-end process should ultimately be “,Up+12poLj O2WL)+O(Uf”
PU2WU QO(O2Q p +)RROWOU2* ,Up+12poLU 2)4oU, 1R O2*U,U+*UV oOVVU,+ p “RpO,
1..1,*)2O*j” *1 mO2 *PU p)W*O12f mO*P 12Lj Q11V RpO*P “,Up+12poLU
UkWL)+O12+d”
aW1214OWpLLjf W1),*+ (OUm “41VU,p*U” *U,4O2p*O12 RUU+ 1R +*,OW*Lj I4% as upheld.246 On the other hand, Van Gorkom and Revlon, as noted,
censor high lock-). 1.*O12+ 12 +Pp,U+ 1, W,1m2 NUmUL p++U*+ p+ “UkWU++O(U”
favoritism. Hence, economics lock-ups can give the first favored bidder only
a relatively small bone. However, such a termination fee will still pay out to
*PU Rp(1,UV oOVVU, +14U +OQ2OROWp2* 41VOW)4 1R RO,4 “(pL)Uf” *P)+ O*
operates with some limited deterrent effect of the process, but presumably
*PO+ LO4O*UV UkWL)+O12 O+ p “,Up+12poLU UkWL)+O12f” O2 LOQP* 1R *PU +*pLMO2Q
horse problem.
Contractually, the answer is more complex. Barkan has clarified that
the back-end process admits of reasonable flexibility and does not
selling the company, you:ve got to make sure that the premium is realized for your
shareholders, because they:re not going to have another chance. So you have to adopt a
process, and your judgment is completely critical as to how you:re going to structure it to try
to get the best price.”).
245. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 178 (Del.
1986) (noting that the white knight entered at $56, $3 above the hostile bid price).
246. See, e.g., McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 505-506 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(dismissing loyalty claim based on deal protection devices because inclusion of a “standard
no-shop provision” and a 3.5% termination fee do not provide “any support for the plaintiffs:
Revlon claims.”)
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necessarily always require a traditional auction-like auction solicitation
(shopping) noisy process, hencU O2 +.UWOpL Wp+U+ mPU,U p W14.p2j O+ “O2
.Lpj” h4Up2O2Q *Pp* *PU .LpjU,+ pLL M21m *1 4pMU *PUO, oU+* 1RRU,+gf p “21+P1.” WLp)+U hmO*P “*pLMO2Q” ,OQP*+g m1)LV oU (OUmUV p+ “41VU,p*U”
favoritism.247 Rights of first refusal are also obviously moderate, since all
bidders always have such implicit rights. 248
On the other hand, invisible processes often might not satisfy Revlon.
If in normal situations a more active shopping process ever is necessary for
a reasonably fair process, then there must not be any closed down funny stuff
going on with that shopping. 249 Second, QVC strongly suggests that no-shop
WLp)+U+ mO*P PUp(OLj ,U+*,OW*UV *pLMO2Q ,OQP*+ h“21-*pLM” WLp)+U+g m1)LV
O2PU,U2*Lj oU “UkWU++O(U” Rp(1,O*O+4d 250
As noted, a Revlon reasonable auctioneer might presumably further
O4.pO, *PU .,1WU++ R1, p LUQO*O4p*U “Q11V RpO*P” ,Up+12d `1, Ukp4.LUf 12Lj
if some bidder were highly problematic, say fundamentally very uncertain or
acting in bad faith (perhaps attempting to expropriate firm confidential
information), thU2 12U W1)LV 4pjoU O4pQO2U p “R)LL UkWL)+O12” p+ p
reasonable/normal one.
I conclude that the expanded Revlon doctrine (like Van Gorkom) deals
mO*P *PU RpW* *Pp* *PU “*pMU1(U, +pLU” .,1WU++ O+ 1o(O1)+f 1, +*,OW*Lj p 4p**U,
of common sense, essentially being nothing more than a reasonable backend process, with both Barkan and Lyondell making clear that some nice
additional front-end would further dispel any process doubts. Again, with
management discredited in the 1980s, the court made a trumpet call for better
process in obvious situations, thereby hopefully curbing managerial reckless
247. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989) (“When,
however, the directors possess a body of reliable evidence with which to evaluate the fairness
of a transaction, they may approve that transaction without conducting an active survey of the
market.”). Flexibility in Barkan is a good thing, since unnecessary expensive shopping that
accomplishes no purposes simply in my view wastes corporate money and jeopardizes
confidential proprietary information, with no real benefits.
248. In re Dollar Thrifty S:holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 608 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[T]the
plaintiffs claim that the Merger Agreement contained onerous deal protections such as . . . a
matching right provision that gave Hertz an unlimited, if extremely time constrained, chance
to match any series of topping bids.”).
249. See, e.g., In re Netsmart Technologies, Inc. S:holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 175 (Del.
Ch. 2007) (describing how the board excluded strategic bidders from its process,
illegitimately favoring only financial buyers, possibly because they would be kinder toward
management); In re Holly Farms Corp. S:holder Litig., 564 A.2d 342, 344 (Del. Ch. 1989)
(noting that the board “shopped”, but unreasonably excluded a disfavored bidder from the
process, by giving high lock-up options to its favored bidder).
250. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 39 (Del.
1994) (describing the provisions of the Original Merger Agreement between Paramount and
Viacom).
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risk taking, where it was reasonably possible to do so.
Revlon Triggers
To understand Revlon effects, one must understand the reasons for those
effects, or the Revlon triggers. In Revlon mode, price and other short-term
(pL)U oUW14U .p,p41)2*f +O2WU *PU +Pp,UP1LVU,+: “O2(U+*4U2*” c “.,1.U,*j”
is either eliminated in a cash-out deal or transformed into something
fundamentally unrecognizable (at least to some extent) after an M&A
*,p2+pW*O12 mO*P p W14.LU*ULj VORRU,U2* W14.p2jf PU2WU p 4p2pQU,:+ +1LU
Q1pL O+ *1 V1 ,OQP* oj *PU .)oLOW +Pp,UP1LVU,+: “O2(U+*4U2*”f 1, .,1.U,*j
,OQP*+f oUj12V 4U,ULj “(1*O2Qf” ,p*PU, *Pp2f +pjf *PO2MO2Q po1)* *PU o,1pVU,
prosperity of the firm and its constituencies. In this situation, the court no
longer wants managers to take Unocal defensive positions, which would be
pure pretext for selling out to a fake big bad wolf white knight, seizing
corporate control, just as the disfavored hostile bidder would do.
As mentioned, the actual Revlon case viewed the Revlon triggers as the
“O2U(O*poOLO*j” 1R p “o,UpM-).f” p POQPLj p41,.P1)+ *U,4d 251 I take the view
that the real Revlon *,OQQU, O+ mPp* ] WpLL *PU “O2U(O*poOLO*j” 1R p “,ULp*O(U
+pLUd” `O,+*f *Pp* “O2U(O*poOLO*j” O+ N)VQUV Lp,QULj *P,1)QP “W14412 +U2+Ud”
`1, Ukp4.LUf OR 4p2pQU4U2* 1o(O1)+Lj 1..1+U+ p “P1+*OLU” oOVVU, hLOMU O2
Revlongf *PU2 *PU “R,OU2VLj” pL*U,2p*O(U +UU4+ 1o(O1)+Lj “O2U(O*poLUd” Yj
invocation of corporate relativity makes one think of Judge Cardozo, who
famously in Palsgraf elaborated:
=PU W12V)W* 1R *PU VURU2Vp2*:+ Q)p,Vf OR p m,12Q O2 O*+ ,ULp*O12 *1 *PU
holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing
far away. Relatively to her it was not negligence at all. Nothing in the
situation gave notice that the falling package had in it the potency of peril to
persons thus removed. Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the
invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a rigP*d <@,11R 1R
2UQLOQU2WU O2 *PU pO,f +1 *1 +.UpMf mOLL 21* V1d: 252
"j p “,ULp*O(U +pLUf” ] +)QQU+* *Pp* 21* pLL +pLU+ 1R p W14.p2j p,U
“O2(U+*4U2*” +pLU+ ,ULp*O(U *1 *PU .U,+.UW*O(U 1R *PU UkO+*O2Q +Pp,UP1LVU,+f
+pj +P1)LV *PU “O2(U+*4U2*” ,U4pO2 R)2Vp4U2*plly very similar at both the
stock and firm levels. Revlon O2 4j (OUm O2(1L(UV p .U,RUW* “,ULp*O(U +pLUf”
which happened when management tried to sell the company in a cash-out
sale to its favored white knight. If one were to x-ray the public shareholder+:
“O2(U+*4U2*” O2 *Pp* Wp+Uf p Wp+P-out deal would obviously (A) destroy the
stock part, and any possibility of commanding a future control premium in a

251. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
252. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103, 341 (N.Y. 1928).
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later sale, and (B) fundamentally change the nature of the underlying
corporation, with control obviously shifting to that favored white knight.
Beyond Revlon, no one was certain what else could be considered a Revlon
“,ULp*O(U +pLU”f +O2WU 12U W1)LV O4pQO2U “O2(U+*4U2*” *O2MU,O2Q “,ULp*O(ULj”f
in degrees, but not in absolutes. For example, under the pro-board Time253
and Ivanhoe254 doctrines, the court essentially took the view that if
4p2pQU4U2*:+ VURU2+O(U 4Up+),U+ MU.* *PU W14.p2j “O2VU.U2VU2*”
h4Up2O2Q mO*P1)* p Pp,V “W12*,1L +POR*”gf *PU2 *PU “O2(U+*4U2*” hU(U2 OR
+14UmPp* *O2MU,UV mO*P O2 p “+pLU” +O*)ation) would not sufficiently be
affected, hence the Revlon doctrine would not apply to what the court would
view as a strictly Unocal fact pattern.
Of course, one could observe that those cases involve some slight or
VUop*poLU +Pp,UP1LVU, “O2(U+*4U2*” *O2kering, particularly Ivanhoe. At the
stock level, giving a favored white knight a 49.7% ownership block 255 would
give a large enough block that would forever eliminate any chance of the
.)oLOW +Pp,UP1LVU,+: “O2(U+*4U2*” W144p2VO2Q p W12*,1L .,U4O)4 hU(U2 OR
such a right is somewhat speculative). At the firm level, the standstill
agreement, preventing new white knight acquisitions to seize control, would
expire after 10 years,256 and then also speculatively result in an eventual
“W12*,1L +POR*” O2 *PU 21* *11 distant future. Hence, the evolution of the
Revlon doctrine ends not being as pro-shareholder as it might have been
interpreted immediately after Revlon.
In contrast to Time and Ivanhoe, the subsequent pro-shareholder QVC257
case adds that an imminent hard “W12*,1L +POR*” mOLL *,OQQU, Revlon mode in
p “,ULp*O(U +pLUf258 even falling short of a Revlon cash-out transaction. I use
the word hard, since a separate Restaurant Associates259 case teaches that a
+1R* “W12*,1L +POR*f” mPU,U 4p2pQU4U2* PpV pL,UpVj 1m2UV H8% practical
control of a company pre-deal,260 m1)LV 21* oU (OUmUV p+ p WLUp, “,ULp*O(U
+pLUd” ]* O+ pL+1 m1,*P 4U2*O12O2Q *Pp* O2 *PU ,UWU2* C&J Energy case,261 the
W1),* U(U2 .U,Pp.+ O2 4j (OUm *1jUV mO*P *PU OVUp *Pp* p “W12*,1L +POR*”
253. Paramount Commc:ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1140 (Del. 1989).
254. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Min. Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
255. Id. at 1337.
256. Id. at 1338.
257. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 34 (Del. 1994).
258. See id. at 46 (“[M]acmillan and Barkan are clear in holding that a change of control
imposes on directors the obligation to obtain the best value reasonably available to the
stockholders . . . .”).
259. Freedman v. Restaurant Associates Industries, Inc., 1987 WL 14323 (Del. Ch. 1987).
260. Id. at *2.
261. C&J Energy Services, Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Employees: Ret. Trust, 107 A.3d
1049 (Del. 2014).
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maybe one day would not trigger Revlon mode, with the right contractual
protections softening and limiting controller power. 262
In conclusion, then, I observe that the real Revlon trigger is not just a
“,ULp*O(U +pLUf” o)* O* 4)+* oU p (U,j WLUp, “,ULp*O(U +pLUf” mO*P *PU W1),*
drawing the line with Restaurant Associates, Time, and Ivanhoe as merely
VUop*poLj “,ULp*O(Uf” (U,+)+ QVC and Revlon p+ WLUp,Lj “,ULp*O(Ud” X1*U *Pp*
O2 *PU tULpmp,U “O2VU.U2VU2*” W14.p2j +j+*U4f *PU (p+* 4pN1,O*j 1R “+pLU”
deals would presumably be deba*poLj “212-,ULp*O(Uf” p2V PU2WU Unocal
rather than Revlon mode cases. All this later jurisprudence then severely
contracted the possibilities for invoking the Revlon doctrine.
iii. Omnicare (Act I and a Half)
In Omnicare, the company was in a desperate situation, hence the board
sought to lock-O2 p “mP1..U,” VUpL 1RRU, *Pp* Wp4U pL12Qf 263 by disabling
V)pL o1p,V p2V +Pp,UP1LVU, W12*,pW*)pL “1)*+”f264 should a superior deal
surface. Although technically outside Revlon 41VU mO*P1)* p “W12*,1L
shift,” 265 *PU W1),* PULV *Pp* +)WP Kbb3 Q1(U,2p2WU “L1WM-).+f” R1,UWL1+O2Q
rival bidders from process access, were fundamentally impermissible, no
matter whether in Unocal or Revlon mode.266 Of course, there was some kind
1R “+pLU” .Lp2 *Pp* mp+ VUop*poLj Revlon “,ULp*O(Uf” PU2WU ] 1o+U,(U *Pp* 12U
could view Omnicare +*,12QU, “Q1(U,2p2WU” L1WM-ups scrutiny (over and
above Unocal but below Revlon) as Act I and a Half.

262. If a controller is “contractually” kept passive, then in some sense, the “control shift”
is not so hard.
263. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 922 (Del. 2003) (“On
June 25, the economic terms of the Genesis proposal included repayment of the NCS senior
debt in full, full assumption of trade credit obligations, an exchange offer or direct purchase
of the NCS Notes providing NCS Noteholders with a combination of cash and Genesis
common stock equal to the par value of the NCS Notes (not including accrued interest), and
$20 million in value for the NCS common stock.”).
264. See id. at 933 (“Genesis insisted the merger agreement include a Section 251(c)
clause, mandating its submission for a stockholder vote even if the board:s recommendation
was withdrawn. Genesis further insisted that the merger agreement omit any effective
fiduciary out clause.”).
265. See id. at 929 (“[B]ecause the stock-for-stock merger between Genesis and NCS did
not result in a change of control, the NCS directors: duties under Revlon were not triggered
by the decision to merge with Genesis.”).
266. See id. at 939 (“In the context of this preclusive and coercive lock up case, the
protection of Genesis: contractual expectations must yield to the supervening responsibility
of the directors to discharge their fiduciary duties on a continuing basis. The merger
agreement and voting agreements, as they were combined to operate in concert in this case,
are inconsistent with the NCS directors: fiduciary duties.”).

90

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21:1

III. Cleansing
Whereas charter exculpations would reverse Van Gorkom “Q,1++
2UQLOQU2WUf” pLL *Pp* VOV 21*PO2Q R1, “VO+L1jpL*j” hO2WL)VO2Q Revlon).267 As
*PU KDEb+: (U,j +Wp,j +*1,4+ hR1, 4p2pQU,+g WpL4UV V1m2f W1),*+ L11MUV R1,
new ways of ensuring “fair” deals for all, but with more litigation comfort
for corporate managerial defendants, particularly given that courts in
W14.U*U2WU p,U 21* *,)Lj Uk.U,*+ 12 “RpO,2U++ (pL)p*O12+.”.
]2 ,UWU2* jUp,+f *PU2f (U,*OWpL “W12RLOW*+” V)*OU+ Pp(U 4OQ,p*UV RO,+* R,14
100% void toward merely voidable (as noted above) and then toward
“WLUp2+O2Q+” h)+O2Q (p,O1)+ R1,4+ 1R R)LLj O2R1,4UV “O2VU.U2VU2*
.,1WU++U+”gd268 [,ppM4p2 WpLL+ *PU+U 4UWPp2O+4+ p+ R1,4+ 1R “*,)+*UU+PO.”
+*,p*UQOU+f mPOWP ] 1o+U,(U +1L(U p2j “pQU2Wj .,1oLU4+f” oj ,UV)WOng agent
“VO+W,U*O12” hp+ 1..1+UV *1 +*OWM ROV)WOp,j V)*j o,UpWP “LOpoOLO*OU+”gd
!LUp2+O2Q “URRUW*+” hOR V12U ,OQP*gf p.p,* R,14 Unocal,269 can revert the
disloyalty scrutiny from entire fairness to the business judgment rule. 270
Notice how as Revlon further expanded vertical fiduciary duties, the
pro-board subsequent developments of exculpations and cleansings together
effectively also .,1.1,*O12p*ULj Uk.p2VUV *PU o1p,V:+ o)+O2U++ N)VQU4U2*
,)LU “+POULVd” This movement has ultimately facilitated that Middle Way
oU*mUU2 Kbb3 VO+L1jpL*j “.,1POoO*O12+” p2V oLp2MU* VO+L1jpL*j
“UkW)L.p*O12+d” ^1.UR)LLjf *PU+U +*,p*UQOU+ +)RROWOU2*Lj ,UV)WU conflicts
suspicions so that, at least in most cases, the good empirically now outweighs
the bad. But how?
For either road, courts would want genuine disinterestedness, as
opposed to token independence. Hence, courts ideally would want 100%
267. See Berry, supra note 164, at 1126-27 (“[S]ection 102(b)(7) provides that directors
are not protected from liability arising from their bad faith conduct.”). “Some Delaware courts
have concluded that the duty of good faith is merely a subset of the duty of loyalty.” Id. at
1128, n.18.
268. See Del Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 144 (statutory requirements for “cleansing” certain kinds
of director “conflicts”); Cooke v. Oolie, 2000 WL 710199 (Del. Ch. 2000) (broadening the
scope of “conflicts” that can be so “cleansed”).
269. See Bainbridge, supra note 40, at 819 (In Unocal cases, “the board:s burden of proof
is more easily carried if the key decisions are made by independent directors.”). I observe
that Unocal provides that the imprimatur of a majority of disinterested directors merely results
in additional board deference rather than 100% scrutiny reversal, presumably since board
“defenses” are “strategic” as much as “tainted,” PU2WU ,U-)O,O2Q +O4)L*p2U1)+ 4OkUV “O2+OVU,”
p2V “1)*+OVU,” W14.U*U2WUf O2 W12*,p+* *1 “VO+L1jpL*jd”
270. One could imagine lots of gadfly lawsuits, even with arguably fair deals, which prodefendant attorney called a terrible burden on the economy. Apparently, when disloyalty
intrusion was too strong, 95% of deals were sued. PLI Conference, Delaware Law
Developments 2017: What All Business Lawyers Need to Know.
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independence mO*P (O,*)pLLj 21 O2+OVU,+ O2(1L(UV “R,14 *PU 1)*+U*f” 271 not
“*11 4)WP” 412Ujf .1mU,f 1, Rp4OLj *OU+ oU*mUU2 O2VU.U2VU2* VO,UW*1,+ p2V
any insiders,272 and no domination, muscling, or coercion by the insiders. 273
Y1,U O4.1,*p2*f W1),*+ m1)LV ,U-)O,U ,UpL “4)+WLU” oUPO2V *Pp*
independence, meaning an active quasi-p,4:+ LU2Q*P h,p*PU, *Pp2 .p++O(Ug
directorial bargaining process. 274 All this makes me think of Antisthenes, a
first-generation Socratic proclaimed, who similarly praised independence
combined with strength.
There might be a couple objections to the rise of cleansing mechanisms.
First, I once heard it asked in a recent PLI conference, what if an insider were
*1 +pjf “]:4 +*UpLO2Qf ]:4 p opV Q)jf o)* ]:4 *,p2+.p,U2*9” 275 Second,
Eisenberg once rolled his UjU+ p* *PU OVUp 1R mPp* PU +pm p+ “WP)44j”
disinterested mechanisms. 276 In the current times, however, I have great faith
in the promise of cleansing mechanisms, in contrast with the bad old days.
271. Note how in Weinberger, the court did not give any cleansing effect when trained
directors participated in the process and withdraw only “at the end.”
272. Since this is not a none-or-all matter, courts invariably must confront the question of
what level of “ties” are acceptable versus illegitimate. See Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 3.2
(“Truly independent directors are board members who are not strongly tied by high-powered
financial incentives to any of the company:s constituencies but who are motivated principally
by ethical and reputational concerns.”); Kahn v. Tremont Corp. 693 A.2d 422, 429-30 (Del.
1997) (disqualifying the independent committee members with business client ties to the
insiders). However, some level of “financial ties” to the corporation might make sense for,
say, a 5% institutional shareholder appointed “independent” director, since some “muscle”
wouldn:t compromise (and would even facilitate) his “objectivity” in the face of vertical or
horizontal conflicts. Even controller appointment of the “independent” directors would often
not be viewed as compromising “objectivity”, absent domination, muscling or coercion, since
“appointment” by itself is the controller:s legitimate “governance right,” by virtue of its
“control.” However, perhaps certain societies with empirical problems might view even
“appointment” alone under some form of “muscling” presumption. See Ventoruzzo, supra
note 89, at 263.
273. See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc. 638 A.2d 1110, 1114 (Del. 1994)
(censoring the insiders from telling the independent committee what to do).
274. See Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 284-85 (Del. 2003) (“[T]he FSC directors, not
the plaintiffs, bear the burden of proving that the MEC merger was approved by a committee
of disinterested directors, acting independently, with real bargaining power to negotiate the
terms of the merger.”); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937-38 (Del. 1985) (“[I]t
is clear that these contending parties to the merger in fact exerted their bargaining power
against one another at arm:s length. This is of considerable importance when addressing
ultimate questions of fairness, since it may give rise to the proposition that the directors:
actions are more appropriately measured by business judgment standards.”).
275. PLI Conference, supra note 270.
276. See Melvin Eisenberg, Self-Interested Transactions in Corporate Law, 13 J. CORP. L.
997, 1002 (1988) (“[D]irectors, by virtue of their collegial relationships, are unlikely to treat
one of their number with the degree of wariness with which they would approach a transaction
with a third party.”).
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A priori, adequate cleansing mechanisms should work better in terms of
shrinking managerial powers and expanding institutional shareholder
powers.277 >*,12QU, ,ULp*O(U “+Pp,UP1LVU, .1mU,” O+ p +*,12Q p,Q)4U2* R1,
weaker corporate regulatory law. 278 Empirically, I believe that there is strong
evidence today that sophisticated institutional shareholders are influencing
independent boards and using their muscle to bargain fiercely for their short*U,4 “O2(U+*4U2*” .,1.U,*j ,OQP*+ O2 *pO2*UV VUpL +O*)p*O12+d `1, Ukp4.LUf
the independent board recently aggressively pushed back for more minority
“W12+OVU,p*O12” pQpO2+* *PU R1)2VU,:+ .,1.1+UV X1,V+*,14 .,O(p*Oip*O12
plan.279
]2 p2j U(U2*f mPOLU +14U +.UpM po1)* “*PU ,O+U p2V RpLL 1R *PU Revlon
V1W*,O2Uf” 280 oULOU(O2Q *Pp* N)VQU+ *1Vpj p,U LU++ LOMULj *1 QU* “VO,UW*Lj”
involved, I view Revlon as being very much alive today, but more in the
minds of the independent processes of the landscape, rather than micromanaged by judges. I observe something of a dance, where the Delaware
N)VQU+ “WpL4 V1m2” hmPOWP ] 12WU PUp,V p tULpmp,U judge express about the
evolution of the Revlon doctrine) – and I add, as the regulated entities exhibit
fewer and fewer governance problems (and the independent process seems
more and more muscular).281 I might add that the highest level of the life of
the judiciary is to implant their vision in the spirit of their people.
3.

Duty of Corporate Monitoring

Although a subset of both the duties of care and loyalty, it makes some
analytic sense to consider the duty of corporate monitoring as its own
category. TPU V)*j op+OWpLLj VUpL+ mO*P p 4p2pQU,:+ V)*OU+f po+U2* o)+O2U++

277. See supra Section II.
278. See Anatomy, supra note 15, at § 2.6 (“Where ownership of shares is more diffuse,
however, governance mechanisms are less effective, and there is more need for regulatory
mechanisms to take force.”).
279. Benjamin Romano, No Deal: Nordstrom family’s price not enough for board,
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 20, 2018, https://www.seattletimes.com/business/retail/nordstromfamily-ends-quest-to-take-seattle-retailer-private/ [https://perma.cc/4UZ3-9H34] (“Nordstrom family members were apparently unwilling or unable to substantially boost their $50a-share offer for the company that bears their name, prompting the retailer:s independent
directors Tuesday to terminate buyout discussions.”).
280. Lynn A. Stout, Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law, 3
BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 43, 43 (2005).
281. More recent Revlon cases exhibit that objective cool head and steady hand,
notwithstanding flexibility and cleansing. See, e.g., Barkan, 567 A.2d 1279 (where Revlon
effects flexibility nonetheless maximized deal value); Dollar, 13 A.3d at 600 (where deal
certainty would add Revlon short-term value).
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decisions, to actively and reasonably monitor a corporation for illegalities. 282
@POL1+1.POWpLLjf *PU OVUp 1R “412O*1,O2Q” O+ *Pp* 4p2pQU4U2* Wp221*
“212RUp+p2*Lj” +*OWM O*+ PUpV O2 *PU +p2V O2 the face of corporate
“OLLUQpLO*OU+d” ZOMU pLL V)*OU+f “412O*1,O2Q” OVUpL+ QO(U ,O+U *1 p W12)2V,)4d
A2 *PU 12U Pp2Vf mO*P1)* “412O*1,O2Q” OVUpL+f 4p2pQU,+ 4OQP* OQ21,U RO,4
“OLLUQpLO*OU+f” *P)+ Pp,4O2Q *PU o,1pVU, +1WOU*j ho)* .U,Pp.+ 21* *PU RO,4
itselRf OR *P1+U “OLLUQpLO*OU+” pVV “412U*p,j (pL)U”gd A2 *PU 1*PU, Pp2Vf *PU
Lpm 4p2Vp*O2Q *11 4)WP “412O*1,O2Q” Wp2 pL+1 W,Up*U .,1oLU4+f oj 1(U,VU*U,,O2Q 4p2pQU4U2* p+ mULL p+ VO+,).*O2Q RO,4 “Pp,412jd”
Prior to the Enron era, Allis-Chalmers imposed a very soft managerial
duty to monitor for illegalities, in the absence of very severe red flags. 283
While illegal, price fixing in those early years was rampant and would not
devastate the firm or the larger economy. In the post-Enron era, witnessing
the firm and systemic catastrophic consequences of managerial nonfeasance
in the face of certain terrible corporate illegalities, Delaware courts have
since embraced Caremark duties principles, with a stronger trumpet call for
compliance obligations, even if hortatory and typically deferring to the
o1p,V:+ “Q11V RpO*P” N)VQ4U2* *Pp* O*+ W14.LOp2WU .1LOWOU+ p,U +)RROWOU2*f
especially if there are charter exculpations. 284 Caremark notes that only
+j+*U4p*OW 412O*1,O2Q RpOL),U+ W1)LV oU (OUmUV p+ “opV RpO*Pf” 285 a core
vulnerability of even charter exculpations.
] m1)LV *PU2 O4pQO2U LOMULj O2W),,O2Q *PU W1),*:+ Caremark monitoring
angers only in catastrophic Enron-like situations, or something else that is
highly abusive in terms of disrupting the firm or the larger economy. Under
Caremark, a “,Up+12poLU” W14.LOp2WU .POL1+1.Pj p2V .,pkO+ +P1)LV
hopefully go a long way to PUpV 1RR 41+* “212RUp+p2WU” (O1Lp*O12+d AR
course, the Delaware courts might one day have to approach a question on
“*PU LO2U” p2V VUWOVU N)+* P1m *U,,OoLe is terrible enough at the margins,
QO(O2Q V)U W12+OVU,p*O12 *1 *PU “1..1+O2Q” R1,WU+ VO+W)++UV po1(Ud
However, in a hard-working good faith land like ours, one would expect that,
for the most part, Caremark:+ 4U,ULj somewhat hortatory ideals should be
282. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight Duties
after the Financial Crisis, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 859, 873 (2013) (“[A]pparently, the directors
owe a duty to monitor for illegality even if the illegality offers a net pecuniary benefit to
shareholders.”). But see In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106,
126 (Del. Ch. 2009) (noting that there is no duty to monitor for business risks).
283. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 84 (Del. 1963) (holding that
there were no red flags of price fixing by the directors, even with prior violations).
284. See In re Caremark Intern. Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 972 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(deferring to the board:s good faith determinations of compliance).
285. Id. at 971 (“[O]nly a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise
oversight . . . will establish the lack of good faith . . . .”).
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helpful, particularly with the provisions of the federal SEC Sarbanes-Oxley
applying on top of Caremark.286
B. The Horizontal Axis
a.

Governance

Controllers, by definition, obviously have sufficient ownership to
W12*,1L “LUQpL” W1,.1,p*U Q1(U,2p2WUd Ao(O1)+Ljf 4pN1,O*j “W12*,1L” P1LVU,+
are controllers, mathematically speaking. However, in Delaware, others
could also be viewed as controllers, with say a large stake (say 35-40+%),
W14oO2UV mO*P “4)+WLO2Q” p**U4.*+ hLOMU 4pMO2Q *P,Up*+f o1++O2Q p,1)2V
management all the time, over-aggressive tactics in conflicted decisions,
U*Wdgd A2 *PU 1*PU, Pp2Vf 4U,U VO,UW*1, “p..1O2*4U2*” oj O*+ULR O+ *j.OWpLLj
insufficient to give rise to controller status in Delaware, since all that is
presumably part of a large sharehoLVU,:+ LUQO*O4p*U “.,1.U,*j ,OQP*+d”
`O,+*f ] W12+OVU, “*PU 4Up2+” 1R p W12*,1LLU,:+ “W12*,1L” pW-)O+O*O12f
+)WP p+f +pjf W12(U,*O2Q *PU W1,.1,p*U Wp.O*pLOip*O12 O2*1 “V)pL-WLp++ +*1WMf”
U++U2*OpLLj p R1,4 1R “W12*,1LLO2Q 4O21,O*j +*,)W*),U” h“!Y>”g .U,Pp.s
raising firm Kaldor-^OWM+ “O2URROWOU2Wj” .,1oLU4+ LpWMO2Q .,1.1,*O12p*U
“+MO2 O2 *PU Qp4Ud” 287 Hence, SRO regulators in America often demand that
!Y> “W12*,1L” oU RpO,Lj pW-)O,UV .,U-IPO with an ex ante meeting of the
minds (where IPO investors will simplj .pj “LU++ .,OWU” R1, “LU++
W12*,1L”g.288 `,14 *PU +*p*U Lpm .U,+.UW*O(Uf *P1)QPf *Pp* “,UWp.O*pLOip*O12”
re-pLL1Wp*O12 1R “Q1(U,2p2WU” .1mU, O+ p,Q)poLj “VU41W,p*OWpLLj” pV1.*UV
(as the will of all shareholders). 289 Hence, Delaware law might permit
certain dual-WLp++ “,UWp.O*pLOip*O12+” .1+*-IPO, if there is not too much
“W1U,WO12” 1R *PU +Pp,UP1LVU,+d290
>UW12Vf ] W12+OVU, *PU “LO4O*+” 1R p W12*,1LLU,:+ poOLO*j *1 pV1.*

286. See Regina F. Burch, Director Oversight and Monitoring: The Standard of Care and
the Standard of Liability Post-Enron, 6 WYO. L. REV. 481, 508-09 (2006) (noting how
Sarbanes-Oxley imposes stronger monitoring duties, beyond Caremark).
287. For example, a controller with a 5% economic stake and 51% control would not have
the same “firm maximization” as a regular shareholder.
288. See Commentaries and Cases (Teacher:s Manual), supra note 156, § 5.7.3 (“The
theory is that at the IPO managers will adopt the capital structures that maximize the size of
the overall pie, whereas at midstream you can bribe minority shareholders to give you the
votes.”).
289. I call this the corporate democracy problem of shareholders being “free” to relinquish
their “freedoms?”
290. See Lacos Land v. Arden Group, 517 A.2d 271 (Del. Ch. 1986) (shareholder
“coercion” in a recapitalization).
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governance. Controllers, by definition, obviously have sufficient ownership
*1 W12*,1L “LUQpL” W1,.1,p*U Q1(U,2p2WUd ^1mU(U,f Hollinger nonetheless
*UpWPU+ *Pp* *PUj 4)+* 21* “O2U-)O*poLj” 1..,U++O(ULj pV1.* Q1(U,2p2WU
provisions (in violation of the spirit of either duties or the contract).291
"Uj12V W12*,1LLU,+f P1,Oi12*pL “Q1(U,2p2WU” ,OQP*+ p2V V)*OU+ W1)LV oU
made distinct across various public shareholders, if there are charter-adopted
VORRU,U2* “WLp++U+” 1R +*1WM292 (meaning a sub-division of stock with its own
distinctive governance “,OQP*+” p2V “LO4O*+”).
b.

Regulations

As with vertical, horizontal relationships are subject to regulatory
corporate law, typically raising disloyalty more than care issues. While the
minority stockholders typically owe no fiduciary duties (subject perhaps to
a few narrow pockets such as vote buying), 293 controller disloyalty is a much
more ambiguous and complicated issue.
Philosophically speaking, some degree of controller self-interest is
arguably justifiable (just like managerial self-interest). In contrast to
managers, controllers, as near- or majority-owners (assuming their control is
RpO,Lj pW-)O,UVgf Pp(U *PUO, LUQO*O4p*U VO+.,1.1,*O12p*ULj “W1+*LOU,” p2V
“41,U (pL)poLU” .,1.U,*j ,OQP*+ p+ .,O2WO.pL+ 294 and further are not paid
agents of the minority shareholders, 295 in contrast with managers. Moreover,
from a Kaldor-Hicks perspective, absent CMS, controllers as shareholders
should have aligned interests with the minority shareholders, since in
291. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
292. See Del Code. Ann. Tit. 8 § 151(a) (2018) (“Every corporation may issue 1 or more
classes of stock or 1 or more series of stock within any class thereof, any or all of which
classes may be of stock with par value or stock without par value and which classes or series
may have such voting powers, full or limited, or no voting powers, and such designations,
preferences and relative, participating, optional or other special rights, and qualifications,
limitations or restrictions thereof, as shall be stated and expressed in the certificate of
incorporation or of any amendment thereto, or in the resolution or resolutions providing for
the issue of such stock adopted by the board of directors pursuant to authority expressly vested
in it by the provisions of its certificate of incorporation.”).
293. The basic law is that if the public shareholders “sell” their vote, all that must
“advance” shareholder interests. See Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982).
294. I say “costlier,” since buying “control” usually means paying a hefty control
premium, and “more valuable,” since control gives disproportionate advantages that are not
possible with minority ownership, such as access to assets, full governance control, etc.
295. See Greta M. Fung, A Common Goal from Two Different Paths: Protection of
Minority Shareholders in Delaware and Canada, 57 ALB. L. REV. 41, 44 (1993) (noting that
controllers do not intend to benefit minority shareholders); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels,
Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 598 (1986) (stating that controllers do not have to sacrifice their selfinterest for the minority shareholders).
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+)..1+UVLj “U-)pL +O*)p*O12+f” 296 all shareholders should have both stock
investment and firm value maximization incentives.297
Obviously,
controllers (just like institutional investors) should easily overcome any
“W11,VO2p*O12” .,1oLU4+ hO2 W12*,p+* *1 4p p2V .p .)oLOW +Pp,UP1LVU,+gd
Hence, in quite a few normal situations, controllers might arguably even
have “superior” incentives to widely dispersed public shareholders.
On the other hand, there are both controller Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto
efficiency problems. First, as noted, any form of CMS (even if fairly
acquired) would raise concerns that controllers would have sub-optimal
Kaldor-^OWM+ “RO,4 4pkO4Oip*O12” O2WU2*O(U+d Y1,U1(U,f U(U2 mO*P1)*
CMS, if a controller stands to usurp freeze-outs benefits, then it could afford
to sacrifiWU “RO,4” (pL)Ud >UW12Vf @p,U*1-wise, controllers might overpQQ,U++O(ULj Q,po “*11 4)WP” R1, *PU4+UL(U+f +O2WU *PUj P1LV pLL *PU MUj+
against a completely powerless minority, 298 in contrast with the more equal
vertical axis (shareholders have their political voices) and external axis
(creditors can contractually bargain ex ante). To make matters worse,
empirically, controller abuses are (or at least were) a problematic area for
our society.299
Hence, controllers at times are viewed as trustees, who should not be
too self-interested.300 ^1mU(U,f mPp* O+ “*11 4)WP” O+ +14UmPp* p41,.P1)+f
+O2WU O* O2(1L(U+ p2 “pLL1Wp*O12pL” @p,U*1 URROWOU2Wj -)U+*O12 po1)* *PU
relative rights of each horizontal axis side, without an absolute objective
marker, in contrast with thU “.OU 4pkO4Oip*O12” W12WU.* 1R [pLV1,-Hicks
efficiency.301
296. See Commentaries and Cases, supra note 156, § 7.4.1 (observing how the interests
of the controller and the minority shareholders were aligned in equal dividend situations in
the famous Sinclair case).
297. See Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 283 (1988)
(“Another great strength of investor-owned firms is the fact that the owners generally share a
single, well-defined objective: to maximize the net present value of the firm:s earnings per
dollar invested.”).
298. See William Z. Pentelovich & Cynthia F. Gilbertson, Upholding Shareholders’
Interests: 20 Years with the Minnesota Business Corporations Act, 58-OCT BENCH & B.
MINN. 19 (2001) (“The protections of corporate democracy often provide no relief for
minority shareholders oppressed by the majority.”); Zipora Cohen, Fiduciary Duties of
Controlling Shareholders: A Comparative View, 12 U. Pa. J. Int:l Bus. L. 379, 380 (1991)
(noting that controllers control the property of the minority shareholders and make decisions
on their behalf).
299. See Krebs, supra note 54, at 945 (noting an increase in freeze-outs in the 1970s).
300. See Zipora Cohen, Fiduciary Duties of Controlling Shareholders: A Comparative
View, 12 U. PA. J. INT:L BUS. L. 379, 380 (1991) (noting that controllers control the property
of the minority shareholders and make decisions on their behalf).
301. “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is to be contrasted with <Pareto efficiency,: under which a
change is efficient only if the pie increases and every constituent:s piece of pie is also
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I might additionally point out how horizontally, in contrast to the
vertical axis, there are much fewer market and democracy checks (given that
controllers cannot easily be fired or voted out). That might explain why
tULpmp,U N)VQU+ pV1.* p +14UmPp* 41,U pQQ,U++O(U “,UQ)Lp*O12” .p**U,2
along the horizontal axis.
1.

Weinberger Doctrine - Sales and Oppositions

The Weinberger case (and subsequent Weinberger jurisprudence) have
held that virtually all R1,4+ 1R W12*,1LLU, “W12RLOW*UV” R,UUiU-outs would
4U,O* *PU “O2*,)+O(U” U2*O,U RpO,2U++ +W,)*O2j hmO*P *PU o),VU2 +POR*UV *1 *PU
defendant). Just like with vertical disloyalty, 100% horizontal condemnation
would go too far in the shareholder direction, since horizontal conflicts too
can ultimately be good. 302
Delaware courts usually view suspicious freeze-outs, in terms of the
Sinclair benefit-VU*,O4U2* *U+*f 4Up2O2Q 12Lj OR *PU W12*,1LLU, “,UWUO(U+
something [differential] from the [corporation] to the exclusion of, and
VU*,O4U2* *1f 4O21,O*j +Pp,UP1LVU,+d” 303 In plain language, all this basically
4Up2+ *Pp* *PU W12*,1LLU, “VO+.,1.1,*O12p*ULj” +UOiU+ 41,U 1R +14U*PO2Q *Pp2
*PU 4O21,O*jd akp4.LU+ Pp(U O2WL)VUV p2j R1,4+ 1R “VORRU,U2*OpL” VUpL+f 304
including freeze-out mergers in Weinberger,305 being on both sides of the
transaction in Tremont,306 differential consideration in a sale of control in
increased.” See Commentaries and Cases, supra note 156, Introduction, n.1.
302. I observe a few possible good outcomes for freeze-out mergers. For example, if a
controller is abusive, perhaps the minority is better off being taken out of the corporation,
particularly with statutory appraisal to protect the “fair value” price of their shares. From the
firm perspective, perhaps the minority could be gadflies, suing and holding up “value”
controller deals, in a greedy self-interested way. Apart from that, one could imagine in private
equity buy-out transactions how a controller could implement superior “value” plans with
100% control, and no minority or market shot term bias oppositions. Some corporations also
are possibly better off going private, due to SEC regulatory cost savings or advantages of
keeping their proprietary information more secret, without SEC public filings.
303. Id. at § 7.4.1.
304. In contrast, under the market rule, as might be expected from the Sinclair test, a “nondifferential” sale of control is typically viewed as part of the old controller:s property rights,
hence such a claim is typically dismissible, subject perhaps to buyer-side freeze-outs
(discussed below). See Abraham v. Emerson Radio Corp. 901 A.2d 751, 758 (Del. Ch. 2006)
(“The essence of Emerson:s argument that the complaint fails to state a claim is simple: under
Delaware law, Emerson was free, as a general matter, to sell its majority bloc in Sport Supply
for a premium that was not shared with the other Sport Supply stockholders.”).
305. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (involving a freeze-out
merger that cashed out the minority shareholders, with concerns that price was too low).
306. See Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997) (sale from one corporation to
a second corporation controlled by the first corporation:s controlling shareholder).
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John Q Hammons,307 or even seizing a corporate sale opportunity in
Hollinger. While it is worth pointing out, as mentioneVf P1m “W12*,1L”
R)2Vp4U2*pLLj O+ VO+.,1.1,*O12p*ULj “W1+*LOU,” p2V “41,U (pL)poLU” h*P)+f
.U,Pp.+ W12*,1LLU,+ +P1)LV LUQO*O4p*ULj +UOiU “VO+.,1.1,*O12p*ULj” 41,Ugf
controller freeze-outs, without as many market and democratic checks as
with managers, do also raise abuse concerns, hence Weinberger “O2*,)+O12”
embraces a fire-for-fire style of thinking.
In terms of effects, first, Weinberger “RpO,2U++” ,U(OUm WLUp,Lj
contemplates some controller duty to maximize minority public shareholder
interests (typically in a deal situation), like in the vertical Revlon context.
Effectively, Weinberger duties then should, to some extent, expand minority
@p,U*1 “pLL1Wp*O12pL” ,OQP*+d
As the means to the above end, Kraakman observes how Weinberger
o,1pVU2UV 4O21,O*j “(pL)p*O12” O2 +1 4p2j mpj+.308 Weinberger opened the
V11, *1 41,U +WOU2*OROW “4U*P1V+” 1R (pL)p*O12f oUj12V N)+* *PU 1LV tULpmp,U
block method.309 Perhaps more significant, Weinberger took a minority
QU2U,1)+ (OUm 1R *PU 1oNUW*+ 1R *PU 2Um +WOU2WUf OdUdf *PU 4O21,O*j:+ “.,1.U,*j
,OQP*+” *1 oU (pL)UVd 7UO2oU,QU, +UU4UV *1 ,UpV *Pp* 4O21,O*j 4pkO4Oip*O12
duty as giving a control premium or even certain “.,1(poLU” VUpL benefits
(say certain strategic synergies), though courts have since perhaps waffled
on the exact extent of that minority generous Weinberger reading. 310 Second,
Weinberger pL+1 4pVU 21O+U+ po1)* .1++OoLU o,1pVU, “U-)O*poLU ,U4UVOU+”
h+)WP p+ O2N)2W*O12+ 1, ,U+WO++O12+g R1, U(U2 +14U “W12RLOW*+” pL12Ud
However, many argued that Weinberger over-protected minority rights.
Since the old days, then, the court has clearly backed off Weinberger
“U-)O*poLU ,U4UVOU+” hpo+U2* +14U*PO2Q *U,,ible such as fraud) and I have
heard it said by some that the court has even waffled about lighter
“(pL)p*O12+f” p* *O4U+ ,UNUW*O2Q VUpL “oU2URO*+d” 311
So far we have discussed controllers rights to sell, but what about its
307. See In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S:holder Litig., 2009 WL 3165613 (Del. Ch.
2009) (controller and minority shareholders received differential consideration in a sale of
control).
308. See Commentaries and Cases -07."57r’s +.n2./,, supra note 156, § 7.4 (discussing
*PU U(1L)*O12 1R 7UO2oU,QU, “(pL)p*O12” .,O2WO.LU+gd
309. See Weinberger., 457 A.2d at 712 (“However, to the extent [the block method]
excludes other generally accepted techniques used in the financial community and the courts,
it is now clearly outmoded. It is time we recognize this in appraisal and other stock valuation
proceedings and bring our law current on the subject.”gd
310. See Commentaries and Cases -07."57r’s +.n2./,, supra note 156, § 11.9 (observing
three readings of Weinberger “price” maximization – (a) minority discount, (b) control
.,U4O)4 1, U(U2 hWg “.,1(poLU” VUpL oU2URO*+).
311. See id. h.1O2*O2Q 1)* *Pp* *PU Lp*U, ?poMO2 Wp+U +)QQU+*+ *Pp* *PU VUpL “oU2URO*+”
reading is now on shaky ground).
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opposite, i.e., rights not to sell, if a controller unwanted sale would
“VORRU,U2*OpLLj” oU2URO* *PU 4O21,O*j +Pp,UP1LVU,+f p* *PU Uk.U2+U 1R *PU
controller? I observe that the law works exactly as the inverse of the sale
Lpm+d ]R *PU W12*,1LLU, “212-VORRU,U2*OpLLj” Pp+ 21 (or has abandoned) a sale
plan of its own, then one could imagine a Delaware court embracing the
Abraham “4p,MU* ,)LUf” *P)+ LU**O2Q p W12*,1LLU, +O4.Lj 1..1+U p2j
unwanted sales.312 Under Mendel313 and Orman,314 however, when
W12*,1LLU,+ O2O*OpLLj Pp(U *PUO, 1m2 “VORRU,U2*OpL” +pLU .Lp2f controllers have
their property rights merely to oppose unwanted sales, provided that they
implement sufficient Weinberger-+*jLU “O2VU.U2VU2*” .,1WU++U+ p2V do not
“abusively” try to push through their own conflicted plan. 315
2.

Cleansing Weinberger

Just like in the vertical disloyalty context, subsequent post-Weinberger
case law has evolved in the direction of the fair process cleansing principles.
Today, per John Q Hammons316 and CNX Gas,317 all forms of Delaware
controller disloyalty under the Weinberger doctrine are subject to a fair
process cleansing, but with more conditions for reverting to the business
judgment rule than in the strictly directorial context, given the exigencies of
the conflicted controller anti-democratic abuse concerns. Perfectly cleansing
conflicted controller deals now requires, after full and fair disclosures, a noncoercive318 (1*U 1R p 4pN1,O*j 1R VO+O2*U,U+*UV VO,UW*1,+f .L)+ *PU “212-

312. See Abraham v. Emerson Radio Corp., 901 A.2d 751 (Del. Ch. 2006) (illustrating the
market rule at work, absent seller- or buyer-+OVU “po)+U+”gd
313. See Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 298 (Del. Ch. 1994) (where the controller, after
abandoning its purchase plan, “mould not voluntarily sell [company] stock”gd
314. See Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 17 (Del. Ch. 2003) (upholding a controller sale
agreement, which would also veto alternative deals for a period of time, but subject to a nonpo)+O(U pVU-)p*U “O2VU.U2VU2* .,1WU++”gd
315. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000) (controller abusively tried to push
through its own “VORRU,U2*OpL” +pLU plan, while vetoing alternative deals, without an adequate
“O2VU.U2VU2* .,1WU++”gd
316. See In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S:holder Litig., 2009 WL 3165613 at *12
(holding that the entire fairness standard was appropriate).
317. In re CNX Gas Corp. S:Holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 412-13 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding
that under the unified standard for reviewing controlling stockholder freezeouts, the business
judgment rule applies when a freeze-out is conditioned on both the affirmative
recommendation of a special committee and the approval of a majority of the unaffiliated
stockholders).
318. Id. at 411 (noting that a short-form merger must be at the first step tender office price).
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mpO(poLU”319 approval of a majority of disinterested minority shareholders. 320
The same directorial conditions for genuine independence would apply to
controllers.321 If perfectly cleansed, then the business judgment rule would,
O2 *),2f .U,4O* W12*,1LLU,+ *1 V1VQU *PU “p41,.P1)+” @p,U*1 -)U+*O12+ )2VU,
Weinberger entire fairness. Like in the vertical context, while Weinberger
expanded horizontal fiduciary duties, the pro-controller subsequent
developments of cleansings effectively also proportionately expanded the
W12*,1LLU,:+ o)+O2U++ N)VQU4U2* ,)LU “+POULVd” In essence, the rise of these
new perfect cleansing mechanisms strike a Middle Way in Weinberger:+
fire-for-fire philosophy.
Again, as institutional shareholders rise, I expect that they will
influence independent boards and use their muscle to bargain fiercely for
*PUO, +P1,* *U,4 “O2(U+*4U2*” .,1.U,*j ,OQP*+f *P)+ LO4O*O2Q P1,Oi12*pL hN)+*
like vertical) agency problems. Hence, while some cry out for the rise and
fall of Weinberger (like Revlon), Weinberger is very much alive today in the
same sense as Revlon.
3.

Bypassing Weinberger

`,14 *PU W12*,1LLU,:+ .U,+.UW*O(Uf “.U,RUW* WLUp2+O2Q” 4OQP* p* Lp+*
yield business judgment rule review, but at the cost of relinquishing its deal
process control, hence controllers began to look for paths around Weinberger
altogether. It is worth noting as an exception to Weinberger that
traditionally, under Glassman, § 253 short-form freeze-out mergers (where
the minority takeout was less than 10%) were exempted from Weinberger
entire fai,2U++f U(U2 mO*P1)* “WLUp2+O2Qd” 322 Presumably, the philosophy
here is that small minority equals small abuses, especially in light of the
possible good of freeze-out mergers (discussed above).
However, very often, a controller cannot get up to Glassman 90%
319. See PLI Conference, Delaware Law Developments 2017: What All Business Lawyers
Need to Know (while not so clear when the freeze-out process starts, if non-waivability is
missed at the outset, one cannot put the genie back in the bottle).
320. Nonetheless, with some lesser moderate cleansing, it might be possible to shift the
burden of proof to the plaintiff, under the Lynch doctrine. See Hammons, 2009 WL 3165613
at *10 (“<[A]pproval of the transaction by an independent committee of directors or an
informed majority of minority shareholders: would shift the burden of proof on the issue of
fairness to the plaintiff, but would not change that entire fairness was the standard of
review.”). However, the court then would still undertake some form of somewhat ”amorphous” Pareto analysis, in contrast with the perfect cleansing context.
321. See supra notes 271272-274 and accompanying text.
322. See Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247 (Del. 2001) (stating
“If a corporate fiduciary follows the truncated process authorized by § 253, it will not be able
to establish the fair dealing prong of entire fairness.”).
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territory without a first step tender offer, which could be viewed as coercive
for obvious reasons. As mentioned, if a controller undertakes such a first
step tender offer, CNX Gas will subject that to the Weinberger doctrine, thus
requiring ideally perfect cleansing. 323 However, for aspiring would-be
controllers who start as non-controllers, they can as of recent years
potentially reach Glassman short form merger territory with the new §
251(h) short form merger statute, 324 subject to its conditions aimed at
ensuring the integrity of the shareholder will supporting that transaction.
Since 251(h) requires 100% buy-out offers, shareholders are not harmed or
“VOL)*UVf” mPOLU JGKhPg RpWOLO*p*O2Q *PU *m1-tier bid should increase the
universe of available bidde,+f )L*O4p*ULj ,pO+O2Q +Pp,UP1LVU, “.,OWUd”
Whether starting as a controller or non-controller, whether Weinberger or
non-Weinbergerf WLUp,Lj *PU W1),*:+ Q1pL O+ *1 U2+),U p RpO, R,UUiU-out
process, without any funny stuff going on. All Weinberger (and bypassing
Weinberger) jurisprudence thus falls within this unitary maxim.
4.

Looting

Weinberger is limited as a doctrine about conflicted controller sellers.
A second controller sale of control problem happens in the context of abusive
buyers, who are viewUV p+ “L11*U,+d” "j L11*O2Qf ] 4Up2 p2 po)+O(U o)jU,
h,p*PU, *Pp2 +ULLU,g +*UpLO2Q “(pL)U” R,14 *PU 4O21,O*j O2 p21*PU,
“p41,.P1)+” @p,U*1 O2URROWOU2* mpjd ^U2WUf L11*O2Q O+ ,UpLLj 21*PO2Q 41,U
than a buyer-side controller freeze-out.
Delaware law is less suspicious of these buyer-side controller freezeouts than in the Weinberger seller context. First, practically speaking, it is
very difficult for sellers to know which persons are or are not looters, since
looters often do not wear signs. Second, even if it could be done, too much
“V)U VOLOQU2WU” .,U++),U+ 12 U(U,j 4O21, 4p**U, 4OQP* 1(U,-VU*U, “(pL)U”
sales of control. Hence, Abraham325 requires significant investigation of
buyer looting only with serious red flags. 326 Presumably, a care issue, unless
a terrible bad faith error, a charter exculpation should give the old controller
somewhat more latitude in its investigation here.
323. See CNX Gas, 4 A.3d at 410.
324. Del Code. Ann. Tit. 8 § 251(h).
325. See Abraham v. Emerson Radio Corp., 901 A.2d 751 (Del. Ch. 2006) (stating that the
controller must have reason to believe that the buyer is questionable).
326. See id. at 759 (stating that there are no looting red flags). Certain other states might
have a different investigation philosophy, at least in pressing situations. See Perlman v.
Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955) (old controller held liable for buyer:s side “looting”
in a desperate war-time situation, with perhaps more empirical rates of buyer-side freezeouts).
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D. The External Axis
The Delaware W1,.1,p*U Lpm “Uk*U,2pL” pkO+ O+ W14.LOWp*UV, since it
potentially broadly encompasses any imaginable constituency viewed by the
N)VOWOp,j p+ “1)*+OVU” 1R *PU W1,.1,p*O12f +)WP p+ W,UVO*1,+f .,URU,,UV +*1WMf
employees, raiders, suppliers, customers, charitable beneficiaries and even
the government/society. As I discuss in Part II, different nations and even
;d>d +*p*U+ 4OQP* Pp(U VORRU,U2* (OUm+ 1R UkpW*Lj “mP1” O+ O2*U,2pL (U,+)+
external.
Y1+* “Uk*U,2pL” pkO+ Lpm O2 A4U,OWp Pp+ *j.OWpLLj WU2*U,UV 12 W14.LUk
firm-creditor relationships. On the one hand, Delaware corporate law is
.,UV14O2p2*Lj “O2*U,2pL,” .p,*OW)Lp,Lj mPU2 “O2*U,2pL” W12RLOW*+ mO*P
“Uk*U,2pLd” First, from the Kaldor-^OWM+ .U,+.UW*O(Uf “+Pp,UP1LVU,+” hmO*P
o1*P ).+OVU p2V V1m2+OVUg *j.OWpLLj Pp(U oU**U, “RO,4” 4pkO4Oip*O12
O2WU2*O(U+ *Pp2 “W,UVO*1,+d” 327 Even from a Pareto perspective, it might be
preferable to put shareholders first in normal situations. Contractual
creditors have a choice, can do due diligence and then negotiate for desired
ex ante contractual protections, in contrast to equity who depend on strictly
W1,.1,p*U Lpm “.,1*UW*O12+d”
A2 *PU 1*PU, Pp2Vf +14U “Uk*U,2pL”
benevolence (whether mandatory or hortatory) should facilitate corporate
“O2*U,2pLO*OU+f” O2 *PU oOQ .OW*),Uf +pjf oj 21* 1(U,-deterring creditor
contracting.
There p,U *j.OWpLLj 21 “4p2Vp*1,j” tULpmp,U ROV)WOp,j V)*OU+ ,)22O2Q
“Uk*U,2pLLj” *1 W,UVO*1,+ O2 21,4pL +O*)p*O12+d 328 However, under Credit
Lyonnais, insiders suddenly owe at least some duties to creditors (and
.,U+)4poLj *PU .,URU,,UVg 12WU “O2 *PU (OWO2O*j 1R O2+1L(U2Wjd”329 Kraakman
explains that this one-1RR “Uk*U,2pL” V)*j O+ V)U *1 *PU “O2URROWOU2WOU+” 1R *PO+
particular situation in a shareholder-centric law, where shareholder
insolvency-+.UWOROW “1(U,-pQQ,U++O(U” ,O+M *pMO2Q O2WU2*O(U+ W1)LV oUW14U
327. See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate law and the Longterm
Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1327 (“The viability
of this model derives from economic common sense. Only shareholders have strong
incentives to maximize profits, thereby promoting economic efficiency.”).
328. See Cory Dean Kandestin, The Duty to Creditors in Near-Insolvent Firms:
Eliminating the ‘Near-Insolvency’ Distinction, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1242-43
(“Conversely, the only duties owed to creditors in a solvent corporation are contractual in
nature. There is no recognized fiduciary duty that runs directly to creditors of a solvent
corporation.”).
329. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12150,
1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). Of course, what is such an “insolvency”
trigger can be “factually” difficult to determine, like in Credit Lyonnais, where the assets
appeared ostensibly to be greater than the liabilities, but with the key asset a trial judgment
subject to probable reversal on appeal.
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internpLLj “po)+O(Ud” 330 I could further observe that from the perspective of
“pQU2Wj” .,O2WO.LU+f *PU .,O2WO.pLc4p+*U,f O2 “O2+1L(U2Wj” +O*)p*O12+f VU
facto obviously, at least partially, shifts from shareholders to creditors.
However, if triggered, such Credit Lyonnais duties would not run strictly to
W,UVO*1,+ h1, *PU .,URU,,UVgf o)* O2+*UpV *1 *PU U2*O,U “W144)2O*j 1R O2*U,U+*+”
(meaning both shareholders and creditors). 331 In this situation, Kraakman
Uk.LpO2+ *Pp* p )2O(1WpL V)*j m1)LV 21* .,1V)WU RO,4 “URROWOU2Wj” O2WU2*O(U+f
since either side would opportunistically seek out self-interested solutions. 332
Apart from duties, corporate law will mandatorily protect creditors,
with the doctrines of piercing and reverse piercing, 333 if the insiders use the
corporati12:+ LO4O*UV LOpoOLO*j +POULV O2 p2 O2*U,2pLLj “po)+O(U” mpjd =PO+ O+
pL+1 p W14.LOWp*UV 4p**U,d `O,+*f p +Pp,UP1LVU,:+ “LO4O*UV LOpoOLO*j”
protection is an economic bedrock of the American corporation. 334 On the
1*PU, Pp2Vf *pMO2Q “LO4O*UV LOpoOLO*j” *11 far with hard-W1,U W,UVO*1, “terrors”
m1)LV )2VU,4O2U *PU “O2*U,2pL” W1,.1,p*U +j+*U4f oj 1(U,-deterring creditor
contracting. This is also a complex issue. ^U2WUf “rpqWW1,VO2Q *1 p Rp41)+
,U4p,M oj "U2Np4O2 !p,V1i1f .OU,WO2Q *PU (UOL O+ p V1W*,O2U <U2(eloped in
*PU 4O+* 1R 4U*p.P1,d:” 335 My general common sense impression is that
“.OU,WO2Q” O+ p RpO,Lj POQP +*p2Vp,Vf especially if the corporation complies
mO*P W1,.1,p*U “R1,4pLO*OU+f” p2V +1 W1),*+ 1R*U2 mOLL O2(1MU “21 .OU,WO2Q”
holdings, reflecting a 2p,,1m UW1214OW+ 1,OU2*UV W12+*,)W*O12 1R “po)+U+”
along the external axis, subject to some potential significant pockets of
murkier common sense driven “pW*O(O+*” W1),*+f mP1 W1)LV W12WUO(poLj
O2(1MU p o,1pVU, W12+*,)W*O12 1R Uk*U,2pL “terrorsd” In rare cases, courts
4OQP* Pp(U *1 W12R,12* p2 U(U2 41,U W14.LUk *1,* Lpm W,UVO*1, “.OU,WO2Q”
WpLW)Lp*O12f mO*P +Pp,.U, “O2*U,2pLO*OU+” .,1oLU4+ hmO*P 21 RUp,+ 1R 1(U,deterring creditor contracting and fears of over-deterring high utility small
businesses with s4pLL .1WMU*+g p+ mULL p+ +Pp,.U, “Uk*U,2pLO*OU+” .,1oLU4+
(with a bodily injured tort law victim who had no ex ante contractual

330. See Commentaries and *.s7s -07."57r’s +.n2./,, supra note 156, § 4.3
(“Shareholders want to roll the dice because they get all the upside of winning in court but
they can offload most of the downside from a bad outcome on the creditors, i.e., don:t consider
the externality that they are imposing on creditors.”).
331. Credit Lyonnais, at *26 (“At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of
insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes
its duty to the corporate enterprise.”).
332. See Commentaries and Cases, supra note 156, § 4.3 (observing how both sides
“selfishly” will not pick the highest “payoff” for all).
333. By all this, I mean holding personally liable either the controlling shareholders
(piercing) or their affiliated companies (reverse piercing).
334. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 99.
335. Ventoruzzo, supra note 89, at 151.
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choices).336
Another situation that might wake up corporate law in the protection of
W,UVO*1,+ O+ “U-)O*poLU +)o1,VO2p*O12f” p V1Wtrine that treats shareholder loans
O2 “O2+1L(U2Wj” +O*)p*O12+ p+ Wp.O*pL W12*,Oo)*O12+f ,p*PU, *Pp2 VUo*f +O2WU *PU
Lp**U, 4OQP* .1*U2*OpLLj “VOL)*U” *PU WLpO4+ 1R .,U-existing creditors. This is
also a complex issue. On the one hand, those capital contributions make
keep the firm afloat, but creditors again should not be over-deterred. Hence,
equitable subordination is equally amorphous, as Ventoruzzo notes. 337
For pro-W,UVO*1, “VO+*,Oo)*O12 W12+*,pO2*+f” Delaware regulates creditor
“*U,,1,OiO2Q” VO(OVU2V+ mO*P *PU “2O4oLU VO(OVU2V+” *U+*d 338
Beyond creditors, Delaware corporate social responsibility (CSR) laws
pL+1 “4p2Vp*1,OLj” require some basic degree of benevolence toward the
“Uk*U,2pL” m1,LVf i.e., Delaware does not permit any exculpations for
“M21mO2Q” OLLUQpLO*OU+f 339 mPOWPf pL*P1)QP .U,Pp.+ “.,1RO*poLU” R1, *PU RO,4f
would obviously sharply undermine the government and society.
Despite the lack of “mandatory” external axis duties in most situations,
Delaware law does, at least outside Revlon mode,340 “,UWU++O(ULj” .U,4O*
4p2pQU,+ O2 *PUO, VO+W,U*O12 *1 W12+OVU, *PU O2*U,U+*+ 1R “p2j” 1)*+OVU 1*PU,
corporate constituencies, if rationally related to shareholder interests. 341
^U2WUf pL*P1)QP “212-4p2Vp*1,jf” 12U m1)LV Uk.UW* *Pat the insiders
P121,O2Q *PU “Uk*U,2pL” pkO+ *1 +14U Uk*U2* m1)LV pVV W1,.1,p*U “Q11V mOLL”
in many situations, thus facilitating corporate “O2*U,2pLO*OU+”f O2 *PU oOQ
picture.

336. 177 *o##7nt.r37s .nd *.s7s -07."57r’s +.n2./,, supra 21*U KGFf & HdH h“>1 2UO*PU,
opinion [majority or dissent] is very satisfying: Either we go with the majority and create
perverse incentives and inefficient enterprise; or we impose capital maintenance
,U-)O,U4U2*+f mPOWP mU V12:* LOMU (U,j 4)WP R1, 1*PU, ,Up+12+d”g hp2pLjiO2Q 7pLM1(+ky v.
Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414 (N.Y. 1966)).
337. Ventoruzzo, supra note 89, at 246.
338. See Commentaries and Cases, supra note 156156, § 4.2.2 (comparing the Delaware
“2O4oLU VO(OVU2V+” *U+* mO*P *PU Y"!A “O2+1L(U2Wj” *U+*gd
339. See Del Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (carving out from charter exculpations “acts or
omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation
of law”).
340. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (holding Revlon mode ending the power to have concern for “non-stockholder
interests”).
341. See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (stating that “[a]
board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided
there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”).

